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ABSTRACT
Twelve years into the implementation of the Local Government Code
of 1991, it is but opportune to assess how the key features of this
landmark legislation has contributed to (or detracted from) achiev-
ing the balance between local autonomy and accountability.  The
literature on fiscal decentralization suggests that these two goals
are not incompatible.  In fact, real autonomy (in the sense of
subnational governments being able to link their spending deci-
sions with their revenue/tax decisions) promotes fiscal responsibil-
ity.  In the context of the ongoing debate in the Philippines, however,
local autonomy has been equated (by many LGUs officials) with the
independence of LGUs from central government interference.  As
such, LGU officials have focused more on securing even higher lev-
els of block grants in order to address the widely perceived vertical
fiscal imbalance.  However, closer scrutiny of the problem indicates
that greater tax decentralization, coupled with a well-designed inter-
governmental transfer system that includes elements of fiscal equal-
ization and categorical grants conditional on the achievement of
minimum service standards, would better enhance the gains that are
forthcoming from the decentralization process while minimizing the
risks of macro-instability.
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INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) in 1991 marked
the start of fiscal decentralization in the Philippines. Fifteen years into its imple-
mentation, now is an opportune time to assess how this landmark legislation has
contributed to (or detracted from) the achievement of local autonomy with ac-
countability.
It is clear from the literature on fiscal decentralization that these two goals
are not incompatible. The theory of fiscal federalism suggests that autonomy (in
the sense of local governments being able to link their spending decisions with
their revenue/tax decisions) promotes fiscal responsibility (Bird 1999). In other
words, when local governments are truly autonomous "only by choosing to pay
higher or lower taxes can residents of subnational jurisdictions choose the level of
public services they want" (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez 2002). Consequently,
local constituents are more vigilant in enforcing the accountability of local offi-
cials because the connection between the amount of local services they receive
and the amount of local taxes they pay at the margin is clear to them.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
The Philippines has a unitary form of government with a multitiered structure. It
is a presidential republic with a bicameral legislature. The central government
operates through some 20 departments/agencies. Administratively, the country
is divided into 15 administrative regions and most departments maintain regional
offices. However, these regions (except for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao or ARMM) are just administrative subdivisions, not regional govern-
ments with elected regional officials.
The second tier of government is composed of local government units (LGUs)
and one autonomous region, the ARMM. In general, the local government struc-
ture is composed of three layers.1  Provinces comprise the first layer. In turn, the
province is divided into municipalities and component cities, each of which is
further subdivided into barangays, the smallest political unit. At the same time,
independent cities exist at the same level as the provinces, i.e., they share the same
functions and authorities. Independent cities, however, are divided directly into
barangays (Figure 1).
Each level of LGU is headed by an elected chief executive (governor, mayor,
or barangay captain) and has a legislative body, called Sanggunian (composed
of an elected vice-governor/ vice-mayor and council members). All elected offi-
cials have a three-year term of office and are subject to a three-term limit. To a
1 There are four layers in the case of the autonomous region, with the regional government comprising
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large extent, each level of local government is autonomous although the higher
level of government (e.g., province) exercises some degree of supervision over
lower level governments (e.g., municipalities and component cities) in terms of
budgeting and legislation.
As of July 2004, the Philippines has a population of some 82 million living in
79 provinces, 116 cities, 1,500 municipalities, and some 41,974 barangays.2  The
barangay is the smallest political unit and typically composed of 100 to 500 house-
holds (or 500 to 2,000 individuals). The population of an average-size municipality
is about 39,000; an average-size city has about 285,000 individuals; and an aver-
age-size province has about 835,000 individuals.
The Local Government Code of 1991 (also referred to as the Code) and the
Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao (Republic Act 6734) of 19893 jointly define
central-local relations in the Philippines. On the one hand, the Organic Act granted
the regional government powers that were previously held by the central govern-
ment. It also provided for the ARMM's expanded share and automatic retention of
national internal revenue taxes collected in the region, significant regional discre-
tion in development planning, and primacy in the delivery of basic services and
utilization and management of natural resources.
2 These numbers change over time as new local government units are created or converted from one
type to another. In 1991, there were 76 provinces, 66 cities, and 1,540 municipalities.
3 This law was subsequently amended in 2001.
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Considered a landmark legislation, the Code gave rise to a major shift in local
governance. It consolidated and amended the Local Government Code of 1983, the
Local Tax Code (Presidential Decree 231), and the Real Property Tax Code (Presi-
dential Decree 464). The Code includes far-reaching provisions concerning the
assignment of functions across different levels of government, revenue sharing
between the central and the local governments, resource generation/utilization
authorities of LGUs, and the participation of civil society in various aspects of
local governance. In toto, these provisions are aimed at providing the framework
for increased local autonomy.
EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT AND SPENDING DISTRIBUTION
Legal framework
The Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao transfers to the regional government of
the ARMM all powers, functions, and responsibilities heretofore being exercised
by the central government except (1) foreign affairs; (2) national defense; (3)
postal service;  (4) fiscal and monetary policy; (5) administration of justice; (6)
quarantine; (7) citizenship, naturalization, and immigration; (8) general auditing,
civil service, and elections; (9) foreign trade; (10) maritime, land, and air transpor-
tation and communications that affect areas outside the ARMM; and (11) pat-
ents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights.  Consequently, the regional gov-
ernment is primarily responsible for the implementation of programs and projects
on agriculture; agrarian reform, education; environment and natural resources;
health; tourism, trade and industry; social welfare; industrial peace, protection of
workers welfare and promotion of employment; promotion of cooperatives; pro-
vision of assistance to LGUs; and development and regulation of cooperatives.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code transferred  from national
government agencies to LGUs the principal responsibility for the delivery of basic
services and the operation of facilities in the following areas: land use planning,
agricultural extension and research, community-based forestry, solid waste dis-
posal system, environmental management, pollution control, primary health care,
hospital care, social welfare services, provincial/municipal/ city buildings and struc-
tures, public parks, municipal services and enterprises (like public markets and
slaughterhouses), and local infrastructure facilities (like municipal/city and pro-
vincial roads and bridges, health facilities, housing, communal irrigation,  water
supply,  drainage, sewerage, flood control, and intermunicipal telecommunica-
tions).4  In addition, the Code devolved the construction of public school build-
ings to LGUs. In contrast, prior to the implementation of the Code, the functions
4 Local Government Code, Section 17 (b).MANASAN 35
assigned to LGUs were limited to the levy and collection of local taxes; the issu-
ance and enforcement of regulations governing the operation of business activi-
ties in their jurisdictions; and the administration of certain services and facilities
like garbage collection, public cemeteries, public markets, and slaughterhouses.
Then, the central government had the primary responsibility for agricultural plan-
ning and extension, as well as construction and maintenance of local roads and
public buildings and hospitals/ health care facilities.
Under the Code, provinces are assigned functions that involve intermunicipal
provision of services whose catchment area covers more than one municipality,
like operation and maintenance of district and provincial hospitals. On the other
hand, municipalities are generally responsible for the delivery of frontline basic
services, e.g., primary health care, construction, and maintenance of public el-
ementary schools.
The devolution program transferred over 70,000 personnel from selected
national government agencies to LGUs (Table 1). Corresponding to the shift in
personnel and facilities,5 the budgets of most of these agencies were then cut
by 20 percent to 60 percent initially (Table 2). The national government agen-
cies that were most heavily affected by devolution in these terms were the
Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Health (DOH), Department of
Table 1. Number of devolved personnel, 1992
  Number of    Ratio of devolved
 personnel   Number of  personnel to
 before   devolved  predevolution
 devolution   personnel  personnel (%)
 
Department of Agriculture 29,638 17,673 59.6
     Office of the Secretary 29,234 17,664 60.4
     National Meat Inspection Commission 404 9 2.2
Department of Budget and Management 3,532 1,650 46.7
Department of Environment and Natural Resources 21,320 895 4.2
Department of Health 74,896 45,896 61.3
Department of Social Welfare and Development 6,932 4,144 59.8
Other Executive Offices 191 25 13.1
    Philippine Gamefowl Commission 191 25 13.1
Total 136,509  70,283 51.5 
  
Source: 1993 National Expenditure Program, Regional Coordination Staff.
5 Facilities devolved include hospitals, rural health units, barangay health stations, women's/children's
centers, demonstration farms and nurseries, and the like.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 36
Table 2. Agency budgets and devolution, 1992  (in million pesos)
    Ratio of devolved
 Budget   budget  to 
before Devolved predevolution 
devolutiona budgetb budget (%)
 
Department of Agriculture 5,210.0 1,160.7 22.3
Department of Budget and Management 465.4 193.2 41.5
Department of Environment and Natural Resources 1,941.8 87.6 4.5
Department of Health 9,991.4 4,079.6 40.8
Department of Social Welfare and Development 1,320.7 742.7 56.2
Philippine Gamefowl Commission 15.2 0.6 4.1
Total 18,944.5 6,264.4 33.1
      
a Based on the 1992 Expenditure Program.
b Based on cost of devolved functions as allocated nationally by DBM to individual LGUs.
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and Department of Budget and Man-
agement (DBM).
Under Executive Order 507 (which defined the actual implementation of the
devolution program mandated under the Local Government Code)6, many health
programs (e.g., immunization,  control  of  communicable  diseases,  provision  of
drugs and  medicines to devolved facilities, and operation of hospitals in the
National Capital Region or NCR) continue to be funded by the central government
under the budget of the DOH. This implies that the central government budget for
these activities was not devolved in the sense of being "disallowed" in the budget
of the DOH in the post-devolution period. Similarly, the central government con-
tinues to allocate monies for the school building program (now called the Basic
Education Facilities Fund) despite the fact that construction of school building is
devolved to LGUs. This practice has serious implications on how the cost of
devolved functions is reckoned, which is an important first step in gauging the
adequacy of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).
Assessment
The extensive literature on fiscal decentralization identifies the key features
of expenditure assignment that enhance the efficiency gains from fiscal decentrali-
zation: (1) appropriate assignment of expenditure responsibilities across levels of
6 Executive Order 507 provides the DBM with guidelines on the choice of programs and activities that
should be "excluded" or "disallowed" from the budgets of devolved central government agencies in the
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government and (2) unambiguous and clear assignment of functions.
The assignment of functions to the different levels of government is guided
by the decentralization theorem, which states that "each public service should be
provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that
would internalize the benefits and costs of such provision" (Oates 1972).  This
means that expenditure responsibilities whose benefits extend beyond subnational
jurisdictions are best assigned to the central government while the provision of
public goods and services whose benefits are confined within LGUs own political
boundaries should be assigned to the respective LGUs. At the same time, the
stabilization and the redistributive functions of government are best assigned to
the central government because LGUs have limited capacity to affect macroeco-
nomic conditions and they would find it difficult to sustain independent redistri-
bution programs. On the other hand, the lack of clarity in the assignment of expen-
diture responsibility does not only give rise to disputes among the different levels
of governments but also tends to blur accountability across levels of local govern-
ment (McLure and Martinez-Vasquez 2002).
Consistency with decentralization theorem.7  The devolution of expendi-
ture responsibilities to local governments under the Code is generally consistent
with the decentralization theorem (Loehr and Manasan 1999). The activities de-
volved are those that can be provided at lower levels of government. Few of them
have benefits that spill over outside the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU with the
exception of those related to environmental management. Moreover, the Code
permits LGUs to group themselves and coordinate their efforts, services, and
resources for purposes that are mutually beneficial to them (Section 33 of the
Code). To date, there have been many documented cases of smaller LGUs working
together to carry out specific responsibilities (e.g., coastal resource management,
solid waste management, water supply development and distribution) when econo-
mies of scale and/or externalities make such cooperative undertakings appropriate
(e.g., Mercado and Manasan 1999).
One important exception to the application of the decentralization theorem in
the Philippines is education. The primary responsibility for the provision of basic
education rests with the central government although the construction and mainte-
nance of school buildings is devolved to LGUs under the Local Government Code.8
7 The discussion that follows will focus on the assessment of expenditure assignment under the Code.
The expenditure assignment under the Organic Act of the ARMM is explained in Box 1.
8 One of the reasons for not devolving basic education in the Philippines can be traced to the fact that
teachers serve on the Board of Election Inspectors. That is, the teachers man the precincts during
elections and play an important role in the counting of votes. During debates prior to the enactment of the
Local Government Code, concerns were raised that devolving teachers could overly politicize elections
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In contrast, basic education is administered by local governments in many
countries. Three arguments are generally offered why primary education should
be decentralized: (1) the provision of education services is spread out geographi-
cally; (2) smaller schools are generally found to provide higher quality education;
and (3) direct involvement of parents and the local community in schools is ob-
served to be a beneficial determinant of school quality (Ahmad et al. 1997). How-
ever, the decentralization of education finance tends to lead to large differences in
the quality of educational services and many countries take steps to enforce
minimum standards of access and quality even as they decentralize the delivery of
education services.
Clarity in expenditure assignment. On the surface, Section 17 (b) of the
Local Government Code provides an explicit and clear delineation of functions
across levels of governments except perhaps in the area of environment and natu-
ral resource management.9  However, Section 17 (c) allows central government
agencies to continue to implement devolved public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs, and services provided these are "funded
by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other
special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from
foreign sources."  In line with this, Executive Order 53 mandates national govern-
ment agencies (NGAs) to retain management control over all foreign-assisted
projects and/or nationally funded projects even if these involve devolved activi-
Box 1. Assessment of expenditure assignment under the Organic Act
of ARMM
A comparison of RA 6734 and RA 7160 shows that non-ARMM LGUs are treated on an almost
equal footing as the regional government of ARMM in terms of expenditure assignment
although the functions and responsibilities assigned to the regional government of ARMM are
slightly broader than those given to non-ARMM LGUs. In particular, the regional government
of the ARMM is charged with the provision of agrarian reform and education services, promo-
tion of employment and workers’ welfare, and promotion of trade and industry while LGUs
outside of ARMM are not.
On the other hand, ARMM-LGUs and non-ARMM LGUs are treated asymmetrically in terms of
the expenditure responsibilities that are assigned to them. This is so because the regional
government of the ARMM has not devolved any of its functions to the LGUs within its
jurisdiction even if RA 6734 allows it to do so. Thus, ARMM-LGUs are not responsible for any
of the devolved activities that have been transferred to non-ARMM LGUs under the Local
Government Code of 1991.
9 To wit, the Code gives municipalities responsibility for the implementation of community-based forestry
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ties. At the same time, the Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations failed
to define the mechanism/s through which the central government can direct assis-
tance to LGUs under Section 17 (f), which allows the national government or the
next higher level of local government unit to "provide or augment (emphasis
added) the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local govern-
ment unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made avail-
able, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants."
Many of the so-called devolved NGAs tend to make full use of Section 17
(f) of the Code and EO 53 regarding augmentation because they deem it their
responsibility to direct LGU behavior in support of national objectives (Loehr
and Manasan 1999).10  Section 17 (f) also allows Congressmen easy access to
pork barrel funds by merely inserting a special provision in the General Appro-
priations Act, which states that monies from such augmentation funds can only
be released for "projects that are identified by members of Congress." Because
of these incentives on the part of both Congress and devolved central govern-
ment agencies to retain control over funding and implementation of devolved
activities at the center, the budgets of devolved central government agencies
grew disproportionate to the IRA in the post-Code period. In particular, while the
IRA grew by 15 percent yearly on the average between 1994 and 1997, the bud-
get of the DA expanded by 48 percent, the DOH's by 25 percent, and the DSWD's
by 22 percent. Along this line, Capuno et al. (2001) estimate that central govern-
ment agencies (specifically, the DepEd, DOH, DPWH, and DILG) spent signifi-
cant amounts on devolved activities in 1995-1999 (Table 3).
In effect, Section 17 (c) and (f) obfuscate what initially appears to be a
clear-cut assignment of expenditure responsibilities. Gonzalez (1996) goes even
further to say that the prevailing regulatory framework effectively permits the
Table 3. Budget allocations of selected central government agencies for devolved
activities, 1995-1999 (in billion pesos)
  DepEd DOH DILG DPWH Total
 
1995 4.7 0.6 0.2 4.7 10.2
1996 4.2 0.5 0.2 10.6 15.5
1997 4.7 0.4 0.6 10.8 16.5
1998 2.9 0.3 0.2 30.6 34.0
1999 2.8 0.5 0.1 4.0 7.4
Source: Capuno et al. (2001), Table 1a, Table 1b, Table 1c, Table 1d, and Table 1e.
10 For instance, the DOH is accountable for the overall health status of the country in the same way that
the DENR is accountable for overall environmental and natural resource management results.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 40
existence of a two-track delivery system, where both NGAs and LGUs can ini-
tiate devolved activities.
On the other hand, a continuing source of irritant between the central
government and LGUs is the propensity of the central government to pass on
so-called unfunded mandates to LGUs. The most important of these unfunded
mandates refers to the implementation of the salary standardization law and the
provision of additional benefits to health workers under the Magna Carta for
Health Workers. More recently, LGUs are also mandated to pay for the health
insurance premiums of their indigent residents. At the same time, LGUs are ex-
pected to provide budgetary support (either in the form of additional personnel
benefits or outlays for maintenance and other operating expenses) to many cen-
tral government agencies operating at the local level like the police, fire protec-
tion bureau, and local courts.
Trend and composition of LGU expenditures, 1991-2003
Central-local expenditure distribution. Consistent with the devolution program,
total LGU expenditure doubled relative to the gross national product (GNP) and to
the total general government expenditure. Thus, the total LGU spending increased
from an average of 1.6 percent of GNP in 1985-1991 to 3.3 percent of GNP in 1992-
2003. Similarly, the share of LGUs in total general government expenditure net of
debt service rose from an average of 11.0 percent in the pre-Code period to an
average of 21.2 percent in the post-Code period (Table 4).
Meanwhile, Table 5 documents the changing distribution of government
spending on various sectors across different levels of government over time. It
confirms that many devolved functions continue to be shared by the LGUs with
the central government in a significant way.
In line with the transfer of functions to LGUs mandated under the Local
Government Code, the share of local governments in the aggregate in total general
government spending net of debt service doubled from 12.6 percent in 1991 to 25.4
percent in 2003. In particular, the local government share in general government
spending registered substantial increases in the areas of water resource develop-
ment and flood control (from 13% in 1991 to 86% in 2003), housing and community
development (from 33% to 71%), health (from 10% to 58%), power and energy
(from 4% to 40%), other economic services (from 57% to 93%), agriculture (from
3% to 15%), environment and natural resource management (from 0% to 15%), and
education (from 2% to 7%). It is remarkable, however, that the share of LGUs in
total general government spending on the social welfare and labor/employment
sector declined from 11 percent in 1991 to 8 percent in 2003 despite the transfer of
about 60 percent of pre-devolution DSWD personnel to LGUs. LGUs' share in
total general government spending on the transportation and communicationMANASAN 41
sector has grown only minimally (from 15% to 18%) although the Local Govern-
ment Code calls for the devolution of the construction and maintenance of all
local infrastructure facilities and the provision of local telecommunication ser-
vices to LGUs.
Distribution of LGU spending by function. With more resources at their
disposal, total LGU expenditures rose from an average of 1.6 percent of GNP in
1985-1991 to 3.5 percent of GNP in 1993-2003 (Table 6). The increase in total LGU
expenditure was particularly rapid in 1993-1995 but started to taper off in 1996. It is
noteworthy that LGU expenditure at all levels of local government (with the excep-
tion of cities11) declined relative to GNP in 1998 and 1999 following the onset of the
Asian financial crisis. It bounced back in 2000 but contracted once again in 2001-
2003 due to the adverse impact of fiscal restraints on LGU financing.
LGU spending on all sectors also posted increases when expressed relative
to GNP. Thus, LGU spending on the social services sector almost tripled from 0.3
percent of GNP in 1991 to 0.8 percent of GNP in 2003. Meanwhile, LGU allocation
on the general public services sector rose from 0.8 percent of GNP in 1991 to 1.4
percent in 2003. In contrast, LGU spending on the economic services sector ex-
panded only minimally, from 0.7 percent of GNP in 1991 to 0.8 percent in 2003.
Table 4. LGU expenditure relative to GNP and general government expenditure
Ratio of LGU  Expenditure to
expenditure general gov't.















11 The total spending level of city governments in the aggregate did not contract in 1998-2001 but started







































2 Table 5. Percent distribution of NG and LGU expenditures, by type of government
Sectors 1991 1995 2003
TOTAL NG LGU  TOTAL NG LGU TOTAL NG LGU
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 91.0 9.0 100.0 82.0 18.0 100.0 81.1 18.9
Total Economic Services 100.0 88.5 11.5 100.0 81.5 18.5 100.0 77.2 22.8
Agrarian Reform 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Agriculture 100.0 96.6 3.4 100.0 86.1 13.9 100.0 85.2 14.8
Natural Resources 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 94.6 5.4 100.0 85.0 15.0
Industry 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Trade 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Tourism 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Power and Energy 100.0 95.6 4.4 100.0 93.0 7.0 100.0 60.0 40.0
Water Resource Devt/Flood Control 100.0 86.6 13.4 100.0 82.5 17.5 100.0 13.6 86.4
Transportation and Communication 100.0 84.2 15.8 100.0 80.1 19.9 100.0 81.9 18.1
Other Economic Services 100.0 46.8 53.2 100.0 35.4 64.6 100.0 7.0 93.0
Total Social Services 100.0 93.2 6.8 100.0 82.2 17.8 100.0 82.7 17.3
Education 100.0 97.5 2.5 100.0 92.6 7.4 100.0 92.8 7.2
Health 100.0 90.3 9.7 100.0 51.5 48.5 100.0 41.8 58.2
Soc. Welfare/Labor/Other Soc. Serv. 100.0 89.3 10.7 100.0 88.2 11.8 100.0 91.7 8.3
Housing/Community Development 100.0 67.4 32.6 100.0 46.0 54.0 100.0 29.3 70.7
   General Public Service 100.0 74.2 25.8 100.0 64.8 35.2 100.0 59.4 40.6
Public Administration 100.0 60.7 39.3 100.0 49.9 50.1 100.0 40.0 60.0
Peace and Order 100.0 99.3 0.7 100.0 98.4 1.6 100.0 98.8 1.2
   Others 100.0 75.4 24.6 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 35.4 64.6
Defense 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Debt Service 100.0 99.8 0.2 100.0 97.8 2.2 100.0 98.1 1.9
Total Net of Debt Service 100.0 87.4 12.6 100.0 78.2 21.8 100.0 74.6 25.4MANASAN 43
The mandated transfer to LGUs of functions previously discharged by
national government agencies caused a major shift in the size and composition
of LGU budgets. Among the major sectors, social services posted the fastest
rate of growth in 1991-2003, increasing by 21.7 percent yearly on the average
during the period compared to the overall growth in total LGU spending of 8.2
percent.  In contrast, the general public services sector and the economic ser-
vices sector grew at a slower pace (respectively, by 16.4 and 12.6 percent yearly
on the average). Consequently, the share of the social services sector to total
LGU expenditure expanded from 20.5 percent in 1985-1991 to 25.9 percent in
1993-2003 while that of the economic services sector and the general public
services sector contracted, respectively, from 32.9 percent to 24.6 percent and
from 42.8 percent to 40.7 percent (Table 7).
The increase in LGU spending on social services between 1991 and 2003
went to (in order of priority) health, education, housing/community development,
and social welfare. Thus, aggregate LGU expenditure on health rose almost five-
fold from 0.08 percent of GNP in 1991 to 0.38 percent of GNP in 2003 while LGU
spending on education increased by more than three-fold from 0.07 percent of
GNP to 0.22 percent of GNP (Table 6). In contrast, total LGU expenditure on hous-
ing/community development and social welfare services in 2003 was less than
twice their 1991 levels when expressed relative to GNP.
The hefty increases in LGU spending on health and social welfare were
largely due to the fact that the LGUs had very little discretion but to absorb the
cost of devolved health and social welfare personnel, which accounted for more
Table 6. Ratio to GNP of local government expenditures (in percent)
ALL LGUs 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
  
GRAND TOTAL 1.9 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.4
Total Economic Services 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
of which:
Agriculture 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
     Transportation and Communication 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
  Total Social Services 0.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8
    of which:  
      Education 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
       Health 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
  General Public Service 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
  Others 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
  Debt Service 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
* Adjusted for DOH and DA advances.







































4 Table 7. Sectoral distribution of local government expenditures (in percent)
    Average
All LGUs 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
 
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
  Total Economic Services 32.9 24.6 35.8 27.6 25.2 24.6 22.2 22.4
    of which:  
       Agriculture 1.3 3.0 1.1 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.7
       Transportation and Communication 24.6 13.2 27.9 16.1 13.9 12.8 10.7 11.1
  Total Social Services 20.5 25.9 15.4 26.5 26.3 26.6 22.8 24.4
    of which:  
       Education 7.5 7.1 3.6 7.2 7.4 7.6 5.4 6.3
        Health 4.9 11.7 4.2 11.4 12.2 11.5 11.1 11.0
  General Public Service 42.8 40.7 44.5 38.4 39.9 40.6 44.7 41.3
  Others 3.0 6.6 3.5 5.1 6.5 5.9 7.7 9.2
  Debt Service 0.9 2.3 0.8 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.8
* Adjusted for DOH and DA advances.
Source: Annex Table 2.MANASAN 45
than half of the total cost of all devolved personnel. In contrast, higher LGU
expenditures on education and housing/community in the post-Code period largely
reflect the higher priority that local officials assign to these sectors in the more
decentralized regime as LGUs were not locked into previously set (i.e.,
predevolution) central government expenditure levels in these sectors precisely
because they did not have to absorb devolved personnel. The increase in LGU
spending on the education sector may also be attributed to the substantial in-
crease in LGUs' Special Education Fund in the post-Code period as a result of the
mandated adjustments in real property assessments under the Code.
Although aggregate LGU spending on the social services sector registered
a general upward trend in 1991-1997 (when measured relative to GNP and in real per
capita terms), it manifested some stagnation (especially with respect to health
expenditures) in 1998-2001 and a small decline in 2002 and 2003 (Table 6 and Table
8). These movements are common across all levels of local government and appear
to be related to the fiscal difficulties faced by LGUs during this period.12 This
observation is worrisome, considering that provinces and municipalities are pri-
marily responsible for the delivery of basic health services. It also highlights the
need to explore the benefits from a grant program aimed at ensuring that LGUs
provide health services that are consistent with minimum service standards of
access and quality.13
The transportation/communication subsector bore the brunt of the contrac-
tion in the budget share of the economic services sector in 1991-2003. With the
devolution of agricultural extension and environment/natural resource manage-
ment, the expenditure share of these subsectors rose somewhat between 1991 and
2003. In contrast, despite the devolution of the responsibility for local infrastruc-
ture (including the construction and maintenance of local roads) to LGUs, the
share of the transportation/communication subsector in total LGU expenditure
dipped from 24.6 percent in 1985-1991 to 13.2 percent in 1993-2003 (Table 7). Such
decline is unexpected since investment in infrastructure (classified as building
roads, bridges, and canals) ranks high in citizens' preferences. For instance, local
infrastructure is one of the top two priorities of households with respect to gov-
12 While the IRA share of LGUs declined relative to GNP in 1998 and again in 2001, own-source LGU
revenue has been on a downtrend since 1998.
13 The rationale for such a grant program and/or the establishment of minimum service standards stems
from the fact that some services like health and environmental protection generate externalities (i.e.,
benefits spillover beyond the boundaries of the local jurisdiction) or are services that are considered
meritorious and in which the central government has a strong interest to achieve an overriding national
level outcome (e.g., merit goods).  National standards can be enforced in several ways such as by
enticing local governments to spend more on the specified service with a matching grant program
(McLure and Martinez-Vazquez 2002).  Alternatively, the problem could also be addressed by designing
equalization transfers aimed at providing sufficient resources to enable all local governments to provide
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Table 8. Per capita local government expenditures, in 1985 prices (including transfers to
NG)
ALL LGUs 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
  
GRAND TOTAL 218 426 474 506 471 486
  Total Economic Services 78 118 119 124 104 109
    of which:  
       Agriculture 2 13 15 15 14 13
       Transportation and Communication 61 68 66 65 51 54
  Total Social Services 34 113 124 135 107 119
    of which:  
       Education 8 31 35 38 25 31
       Health 9 49 58 58 52 53
  General Public Service 97 163 189 206 210 201
  Others 82 23 13 0 3 64 5
  Debt Service 21 01 01 1 1 31 3
          
*Adjusted for DOH and DA advances.
Source: Annex Table 3.
ernment resource allocation in 16 (80%) out of 20 provinces surveyed in a study
conducted by Azfar et al. (2000).
Although aggregate LGU spending on transportation/communication was
fairly stable at 0.5 percent of GNP for most of the post-Code period, a downtrend in
LGU transportation spending (when measured relative not only to total LGU spend-
ing but also relative to GNP) became evident in 2002-2003. This trend is true for all
levels of local government (Annex Table 3).
These developments appear to be linked to the mismatch in the distribu-
tion of resources and expenditure responsibilities across levels of local govern-
ments. (See further discussion on this below.)  At the same time, these move-
ments are a cause of concern considering the robust and strong association
between economic growth and infrastructure spending. Given that the Code
assigns the primary responsibility for the construction and maintenance of local
infrastructure to local governments, such pattern also points to the increasing
disparity in economic development across levels of local government. It likewise
underscores the importance of creating a suitable regulatory framework for en-
couraging private sector participation in infrastructure (through build-operate-
transfer and joint ventures) at the local level as well as the need for an appropri-
ate grants program for LGU capital investments.
Distribution of LGU spending across levels of local government. In
1991, prior to the implementation of the Local Government Code, provinces
contributed 29.0 percent, municipalities 40.1 percent, and cities 30.9 percent ofMANASAN 47
Table 9. Distribution of LGU expenditures across levels of local government by
function
Sectors            1991        2003
LOCAL Prov. Mun. Cities  LOCAL Prov. Mun. Cities
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 29.0 40.1 30.9 100.0 23.6 34.5 41.9
Total Economic Services 100.0 35.4 33.7 30.9 100.0 27.8 31.9 40.3
Agriculture 100.0 46.9 8.2 44.9 100.0 34.0 46.2 19.8
Natural Resources 100.0 16.1 4.5 79.4
Power and Energy 100.0 16.2 16.3 67.5 100.0 9.0 73.4 17.6
Water Resources Dev't. 100.0 37.0 49.3 13.7 100.0 4.8 73.5 21.7
    & Flood Control
Transportation and Communication 100.0 39.6 31.2 29.2 100.0 32.5 19.2 48.3
Other Economic Services 100.0 14.5 55.2 30.3 100.0 22.4 42.6 35.0
Total Social Services 100.0 33.5 24.1 42.4 100.0 27.8 26.5 45.7
Education 100.0 12.9 41.8 45.3 100.0 20.7 21.0 58.3
Health 100.0 19.8 16.7 63.5 100.0 41.9 27.7 30.3
Soc. Welfare/Labor/Other Soc. Serv. 100.0 19.2 32.1 48.7 100.0 17.4 44.9 37.7
Housing/ Community Development 100.0 68.9 12.8 18.3 100.0 9.6 22.0 68.3
General Public Service 100.0 22.4 51.0 26.6 100.0 19.9 42.9 37.2
Public Administration 100.0 22.6 51.2 26.2 100.0 20.0 43.2 36.8
Peace and Order 100.0 1.6 25.5 72.9 100.0 3.3 19.5 77.2
Others 100.0 30.1 44.9 24.9 100.0 20.2 30.3 49.5
Debt Service 100.0 10.1 15.4 74.5 100.0 20.1 15.2 64.7
Total Net of Debt Service 100.0 29.1 40.3 30.5 100.0 23.7 35.1 41.2
the total local government expenditure (Table 9). Under the devolution pro-
gram, provinces absorbed 47.5 percent, municipalities 48.10 percent, and cities
4.3 percent of the total cost of functions devolved to said levels of govern-
ment (Table 10).14
14 Table 10 was computed using 1992 budgets of devolved national government agencies. The numbers
listed refer to personnel costs (and maintenance and other operating expenditures associated with them),
which were actually transferred to LGUs starting in 1993/1994.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 48
Table 10. Distribution of cost of devolved functions across levels of local government by
function, 1992
Percent distribution Provinces Mun. Cities All LGUs
    across levels of local government
   
General Public Services 7.1 87.7 5.2 100.0
Economic Services 37.9 57.4 4.8 100.0
Agriculture 33.4 61.6 5.0 100.0
Environment and Natural Resources 97.6 0.8 1.6 100.0
Social Services 51.7 44.2 4.2 100.0
Health 60.2 37.2 2.6 100.0
Social Welfare and Employment 4.8 82.3 12.9 100.0
TOTAL 47.5 48.1 4.3 100.0
Percent distribution across functions      
   
General Public Services 0.5 5.6 3.7 3.1
Economic Services 15.9 23.8 22.0 19.9
Agriculture 13.0 23.7 21.5 18.5
Environment and Natural Resources 2.9 0.0 0.5 1.4
Social Services 83.7 70.6 74.3 77.0
Health 82.5 50.4 38.9 65.1
Social Welfare and Employment 1.2 20.3 35.4 11.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Given the relative importance of the provincial and municipal levels in terms
of both pre-Code spending levels and the cost of devolved functions, the dramatic
expansion in the share of cities and the corresponding contraction in the share of
provinces and municipalities in total LGU expenditures in the post-Code period
were rather unexpected and could be best explained by the distribution of re-
sources across levels of local government in the post-Code period. Thus, while the
share of cities in total expenditure of all LGUs in the aggregate rose from 37.8
percent in 1995 to 41.9 percent in 2003, the share of municipalities declined from
37.6 percent to 34.5 percent; that of provinces dipped from 24.6 percent to 23.6
percent. Admittedly, these figures exaggerate the increase in the share of cities in
the total expenditure of all LGUs combined because of the continuous conversion
of municipalities into cities in the post-Code period. Nonetheless, the expansion in
the share of cities in total LGU spending in the post-Code period remains dispro-
portionate even after one adjusts the numbers for the increasing number of cities in
the post-Code period (from 31% in 1991 to approximately 33%-37% in the post-
Code period).
Despite the devolution of the responsibility for local infrastructure, agricul-
tural extension, and some environment/natural resource management functions toMANASAN 49
provinces, municipalities, and cities, the share of provinces and municipalities in
total LGU spending on the economic services sector contracted from 35.4 percent
and 33.7 percent, respectively, in 1991, to 27.8 percent and 31.9 percent, respec-
tively, in 2003, while the share of cities expanded from 30.9 percent to 40.3 percent.
This development is largely driven by the growing share of cities in total LGU
spending on the transportation/communication subsector in the post-Code pe-
riod. Such movement dominates the expansion in the share of provinces in total
LGU spending on other economic services subsector and the increase in the share
of municipalities in total LGU spending on the agriculture and the water resource
development subsectors. Again, these figures tend to exaggerate the expansion in
the share of cities in aggregate LGU spending on the economic services sector
owing to the continuous conversion of municipalities into cities in the post-Code
period. However, the growth in the share of cities in the post-Code period is
significant even after one adjusts the numbers for the increasing number of cities
in the post-Code period.
Similarly, the share of provinces in total LGU spending on the social ser-
vices sector declined from 33.5 percent in 1991 to 27.8 percent in 2003 despite the
absorption of a large number of personnel in the health subsector by provinces
(and the corresponding dramatic rise in the share of provinces in total LGU
spending on the said subsector) as the share of provinces in total LGU spending
on social welfare and housing/community development subsectors declined in
the post-Code period. In contrast, the share of municipalities and cities in total
LGU expenditure on the social services sector rose from 24.2 percent and 42.4
percent, respectively, in 1991, to 26.5 percent and 45.7 percent, respectively, in
2003. The movement was due to the expansion in the share of municipalities in
total LGU spending on the health, social welfare, and housing/ community de-
velopment subsectors and the expansion in the share of cities in total LGU
spending on the housing/community development and education subsectors in
the post-Code period.
Distribution of LGU expenditure by economic category. In the aggregate,
LGU spending on personal services (PS) grew from an average of 0.7 percent of
GNP in 1985-1991 to an average of 1.6 percent of GNP in 1993-2003 (Table 11).
This development is reflective of the transfer of personnel from devolved na-
tional government agencies to LGUs following the implementation of the Local
Government Code. Because LGU spending on personal services has grown at
the same pace as total LGU expenditures, its share in total LGU spending has
remained fairly stable at 47 percent in the pre-Code period as well as in the post-
Code period, making it the most important expenditure item according to eco-







































0 Table 11. Ratio to GNP of local government by object
                            Average             
 A. ALL LGUs 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
   
GRAND TOTAL 1.6 3.5 1.9 2.7 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.4
PS 0.7 1.6 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4
MOOE 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4
CO 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6
                          Average                
B. ALL PROVINCES 1985-1991 1993-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
GRAND TOTAL 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8
 PS 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
MOOE 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
CO 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
                            Average                
C. ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
GRAND TOTAL 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
 PS 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6
MOOE 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
CO 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
                          Average                
D. ALL CITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
GRAND TOTAL 0.5 1.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
PS 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
MOOE 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6









Table 12.  Percent distribution of local government expenditures by type of expenditure (in percent)
                            Average             
 A. ALL LGUs 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
   
 GRAND TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PS 46.5 46.4 44.7 46.6 45.3 47.3 48.1 45.5 49.2
MOOE 37.1 35.2 32.8 34.5 33.4 33.0 34.3 35.5 34.1
CO 16.4 18.4 22.4 18.9 21.4 19.7 17.5 19.1 16.7
Ratio of PS to Reg. Income in 63.9 53.9 66.0 72.8 55.4 62.4 57.8 50.4 54.2
Previous Year
                          Average  
B. ALL PROVINCES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1993** 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PS 44.2 47.7 41.6 49.9 48.4 48.8 50.8 45.1 42.1
MOOE 36.9 35.7 35.2 37.3 35.9 33.8 33.9 35.4 42.8
CO 18.9 16.5 23.3 12.8 15.6 17.4 15.3 19.6 15.1









































                          Average
     C. ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1993** 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 PS 45.9 55.0 46.1 51.5 52.6 55.7 57.9 55.3 50.8
MOOE 39.2 32.0 33.3 32.4 31.3 30.8 31.0 31.1 36.9
CO 14.9 13.0 20.5 16.1 16.1 13.5 11.2 13.6 12.3
Ratio of PS to Reg. Income in 63.6 61.7 68.4 80.7 62.4 71.8 68.8 57.6 48.4
Previous Year
                            Average
     D. ALL CITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003  1991 1993** 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PS 49.4 37.8 45.8 37.4 35.9 38.4 38.1 37.5 34.2
MOOE 34.6 37.8 30.0 35.1 33.8 34.5 37.6 39.2 43.7
CO 16.0 24.4 24.2 27.4 30.3 27.1 24.3 23.4 22.1
Ratio of PS to Reg. Income in 57.1 45.4 57.1 53.8 45.8 50.5 47.0 43.8 36.1
Previous Year
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The share of capital outlays (CO) in aggregate LGU expenditures expanded
from an average of 16.4 percent in 1985-1991 to an average of 18.3 percent in 1993-
2003 even as the budget share of maintenance and other operating expenses
(MOOE) contracted from 37.1 percent to 35.2 percent.  These figures mask the
variations across different levels of local government. Because the budget share
of personal services expanded in the post-Code period in the case of provinces
and municipalities, there was a squeeze not only on their MOOE but also on their
capital outlays in the post-Code period. Thus, the share of MOOE in total LGU
spending contracted from 39.2 percent in 1985-1991 to 31.0 percent in 1993-2003 in
the case of municipalities and from 36.9 percent to 35.7 percent in the case of
provinces. Similarly, the share of capital outlays in total LGU spending declined
from 14.9 percent to 13.0 percent in the case of municipalities and from 18.9 percent
to 16.5 percent in the case of provinces.
The salary structure applicable to mandatory LGU positions is set by the
Compensation and Position Classification Act (CPCA) of 1989. The CPCA, in
tandem with the Codal provisions on mandatory positions, tends to restrict
LGUs’ ability to re-align their outlays for personal services in consonance with
their specific needs and circumstances. In some cases, these restrictions impose
a heavy fiscal burden on LGUs (particularly in the case of provinces and munici-
palities), thus effectively putting a squeeze on the ability of these LGUs’ to fund
maintenance and capital outlays. In other cases, they make it difficult for low-
income class LGUs to retain personnel, particularly in the health sector.
 The Local Government Code imposes a ceiling on PS spending of LGUs
(45%-55% of the total regular income depending on LGU’s income class) but many
exemptions are allowed in reckoning compliance to this mandate. Thus, although
aggregate LGU spending on personal services was slightly below the ceiling in
1993-2003 (at 53.9% of the total LGU regular income in the previous year), the
situation is particularly problematic in the case of municipalities, which posted an
aggregate PS ratio of 61.8 percent during the same period (Table 12).
To make matters worse, personal services expenditure, as recorded in the
financial statements of LGUs, tends to underestimate the amounts that LGUs
actually spend on personnel compensation because of the practice of charg-
ing the salaries and wages of contractual employees hired under so-called “job
orders” or “service contracts” against MOOE or CO (for development projects).
Some LGUs report that this practice is no longer allowed under the new gov-
ernment accounting system (NGAS) while other LGUs claim otherwise. For
instance, a number of LGUs report that 15 percent to 20 percent of their MOOE
is actually used to pay for contractual personnel. Still other LGUs charge some
of their “excess” personal services against the accounts of public enterprises
like public markets.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 54
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
Legal framework15
Table 13 summarizes the various taxes that are assigned to the different levels of
local government. Under the Local Government Code, only provinces and cities
are authorized to levy the real property tax, the proceeds of which are shared with
lower levels of government (i.e., municipalities and barangays in the case of prov-
inces, and barangays in the case of cities). Both provinces and cities are also
allowed to impose a tax on the transfer of real property, sand, gravel, and other
quarry resources; amusement places; franchises; professionals; delivery vans
and trucks; and idle lands.16  Meanwhile, municipalities and cities (but not prov-
inces) are authorized to levy the community tax and the local business tax (i.e.,
turnover tax levied on the gross receipts of businesses/traders).
Table 13. Tax assignment in cities, provinces, and municipalities
Subject Cities Prov. Mun. Brgy.
Real property transfers bb
Business of printing and publication bb
Franchise bb
Sand, gravel, and other quarry resources bb aa
Amusement places bb a
Professionals bb
Delivery vans and trucks bb
Real property bb aa
Idle lands bb
Business bb b
Community tax bb a
aShares in proceeds of levy of province.
Section 133 of the Code lists in some detail the taxes that LGUs are not
allowed to touch and that are reserved for the central government. These include
the income tax (individual and corporate), customs duties, value-added tax, and
excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and petroleum products.
At the same time, the National Internal Revenue Code does not provide for a
central government real property tax or for a central government community tax
(poll tax).
15 The discussion that follows refers to the tax assignment under the Local Government Code. Tax
assignment in the ARMM is taken up in Box 2.
16 Lower level local governments likewise have a share in the proceeds of the sand/gravel tax,
amusement tax, and community tax.MANASAN 55
Assessment
The traditional literature on fiscal federalism (e.g., Shah 1994; Ter-Minassian
1997; Bird 1999) provides three general criteria for assessing the appropriate-
ness of tax assignment:  economic efficiency, equity, and administrative feasibil-
ity. The economic efficiency criterion suggests that each level of government
should be assigned taxes that are related to the benefits of its spending respon-
sibility. Thus, user charges for identifiable public services that are provided by
subnational governments and taxes that are levied based on the benefit principle
(e.g., motor vehicle taxes, which may be used to finance the construction and
finance of local infrastructure) are best assigned to LGUs. To the extent that
LGUs have to resort to nonbenefit taxation, theory suggests that local govern-
ments are assigned tax bases that have low interjurisdictional mobility. Other-
wise, nonuniform tax rates levied by different LGUs will distort the geographic
allocation of economic resources.
The surveyed literature argues that progressive taxes (i.e., those that are
based on one’s  ability to pay) should finance the redistributive function of gov-
ernment. Since this function is generally ascribed to the central government, pro-
gressive taxes are best assigned to the central government. Lastly, the concern for
administrative efficiency indicates that the authority to collect particular types of
taxes should be given to the level of government that is able to do so with the least
collection and enforcement cost.
The new view on tax assignment (e.g., Bird 1999; McLure 1999) empha-
sizes the need to provide subnational governments with fiscal autonomy. In
this sense, what is important is for local governments (1) to have their own
source of revenues and (2) to have the power to control the amount of rev-
enues they receive at the margin to be able to fund the level of services they
Box 2. Tax assignment in the ARMM
Under RA 6733, the regional government of the ARMM was authorized to levy all types of
taxes with the exception of the income tax and customs duties. In practice, however, the
regional government of the ARMM does not touch any of the taxes that the central govern-
ment levies. Instead, it has chosen to impose a supplementary rate (i.e., a surcharge) on taxes
that are typically levied by provincial governments under the Local Government Code like the
real property tax, the sand and gravel tax, the amusement tax, the professional tax, and the
franchise tax.*  In this sense, the amended Organic Act of the ARMM (Republic Act 9054)
simply formalizes the symmetrical treatment of the ARMM and the LGUs with regard to the
limitations on their taxing powers.
   * In practice, the regional government of ARMM imposes tax rates that are 60%-90% lower
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prefer.17  As such, “subnational governments would have to face the full
marginal tax price of the spending decisions for which they are responsible”
(Bird 1999).
Given this background, the Philippine tax assignment appears to be largely
consistent with the traditional view. Two of the more important sources of tax
revenue for LGUs, the real property tax and the community tax, are taxes on immo-
bile factors. LGUs also enjoy a wide latitude when it comes to the amount of fees
and other user charges that they may levy.
However, the current tax assignment scores low in the autonomy criterion.
While the Local Government Code authorizes LGUs to levy local taxes on a good
number of tax bases (including some which were not allowed under Presidential
Decree 231 and Presidential Decree 464 during the pre-Code period like banks and
other financial institutions, and printing/publication), the size of the base of taxes
outside of the real property tax and the local business tax is not significant. Also,
despite these changes, the bulk of the productive tax bases still rests with the
central government.
The Local Government Code also seriously limits their power to set local tax
rates. One, the Code fixes the tax rate of some of the taxes that are assigned to
LGUs (like the SEF real property tax and the community tax). Two, while LGUs do
have some discretion in setting tax rates of other local taxes, the Code sets limits
(i.e., floors and ceilings) on the tax rates that LGUs may impose. Moreover, the
maximum allowable rates appear to be low. For instance, although the Local Gov-
ernment Code raised the ceiling rate for real property taxation at the provincial
level from 0.5 percent to 1 percent, it withdrew the power of  municipalities18 to
impose such tax (Table 13), thus maintaining the effective real property tax rate in
provincial municipalities at the pre-Local Government Code level (Manasan 1992).
In terms of real property assessment levels, the Code sets maximum assessment
rates for different classes of property. In contrast, the assessment rates were fixed
in the pre-Code period. The maximum assessment rates set under the Code are no
higher and often significantly lower than the fixed assessment rates in the pre-
Code period19, thus reducing the effective assessment levels of residential land, all
types of buildings and machinery, which in turn leads to a potentially substantial
reduction in real property tax revenues.
17 It may be noted that while revenue sharing with the central government (e.g., through block grants) may
provide LGUs with adequate own-source revenues, this scheme does not provide fiscal autonomy
because subnational governments do not have the power to influence the amount of shared revenues
they receive.
18 Municipalities in Metro Manila are still allowed to impose real property taxes.
19 The Code also exempts from real property taxation residential buildings with market value below
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Three, the Code mandates that tax rates can only be adjusted once in five
years and by no more than 10 percent.  This provision is particularly restrictive for
taxes (e.g., the professional tax and the tax on delivery vans and trucks) whose
rates are specified in nominal peso terms. Clearly, the resulting adjustments will
not allow LGUs to maintain the real value of their revenues.
Thus, future Code amendments should look at giving LGUs greater discre-
tion in setting tax rates by raising the maximum allowable tax rates.  Moreover,
there is a need to move away from tax rates that are not indexed to inflation as such
practice necessitates frequent revisions of local tax ordinances if LGUs want to
keep their own-source revenues buoyant.
Also, the tax structure prescribed by the Code for the local business tax is
too complex such that different categories of firms are subject to different rate
schedules. This situation tends to increase administrative and compliance costs
and further strains the capacity of an already weak local tax administration
(Taliercio 2003).
It is worth noting that many tax personnel are not well equipped technically
for their tasks. Also, very few tax units have certified public accountants, thereby
impairing their audit capability. Moreover, not many LGUs have computers that
will help them improve their revenue performance.
That local tax administration is severely inadequate in many LGUs is high-
lighted in Table 14. It shows the declining trend in real property tax collection
efficiency of both provinces and cities in the post-Code period.
Finally, many LGU officials tend to underutilize their tax powers. For in-
stance, many provinces and cities have done a general revision of the schedule
of market values only once since 1991, resulting in declining collections in real
Table 14. Collection rate of current year for basic real property tax, 1983-
1999
       
   All  LGUs   Provinces  Cities
    
1989 58.0 55.6 61.0
1991 58.9 54.1 65.1
1994 60.7 54.0 66.3
1997 57.4 50.0 62.0
1999 54.1 52.4 54.9
2000 54.6 44.7 57.1
Average
1989-1991 58.2 54.4 63.1
1992-2000 55.4 49.0 59.7PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 58
terms.20 Also, few LGUs have revised their local tax codes since 1992 even if the
rates of some of the taxes are not indexed to inflation.  This is reportedly due to
the resistance of the local chief executive or the local Sanggunian (or both) to
increase the tax rates in general for fear of a political backlash. It also appears to
be related to the poor incentives resulting from the mismatch between the as-
signment of taxes and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to the dif-
ferent levels of local government (More on this point below.)  In particular, the
share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU own-source revenue has
declined  in the post-Code period despite their substantial share in the cost of
devolved functions.
Trend and composition of LGU revenues, 1991-2001
National/subnational revenue distribution. Table 15 and Table 16 confirm that
the bulk of the productive sources of local revenue remain with the central govern-
ment even in the post-Code period. They also show that many LGUs have not fully
utilized their revenue-raising powers due to political constraints and to the disin-
centive effect of the IRA distribution formula on local tax effort. Thus, the contri-
bution of LGUs to total revenues of the general government (central government
and LGUs combined) remains low—an average of 6.9 percent in 1992-2003 com-
20 The Code mandates LGUs to conduct a general revision of market values once every three years with
the first one taking effect in 1994.
Table 15. Share of national and subnational governments to general government
revenue (in percent)
 
  National Government        Local Government
Levels Total Tax Nontax  Total Tax Nontax
  
1985 94.1 95.5 84.2 5.9 4.5 15.8
1987 95.5 96.2 92.2 4.5 3.8 7.8
1989 95.2 96.3 90.6 4.8 3.7 9.4
1991 95.4 96.3 91.6 4.6 3.7 8.4
1993 93.6 94.4 88.2 6.4 5.6 11.8
1995 94.1 94.8 90.0 5.9 5.2 10.0
1997 93.5 94.4 87.4 6.5 5.6 12.6
1999 92.7 93.8 83.8 7.3 6.2 16.2
2001 92.8 93.6 87.4 7.2 6.4 12.6
2003 92.0 92.6 88.6 8.0 7.4 11.4
   
Average  
1985-1991 95.1 96.1 90.9 4.9 3.9 9.1
1992-2003 93.1 94.0 87.4 6.9 6.0 12.6MANASAN 59
pared to an average of 4.9 percent in 1985-1991 (Table 15). Moreover, local govern-
ment revenue effort rose only marginally from an average of 0.8 percent of GNP in
the pre-Code period to an average of 1.2 percent of GNP in the post-Code period
(Table 16).
Distribution of LGU own-source revenue across levels of local govern-
ment. The assignment of revenues under the Local Government Code has effec-
tively shifted the distribution of own-source revenue from municipalities and prov-
inces in favor of cities. The Code not only allows cities to impose all the taxes that
provinces and municipalities are authorized to levy; it also gives them greater
discretion in setting the tax rates. Also, under the Code, the share of provinces in
the proceeds of the real property tax (35%) is smaller than that of cities (70%) and
municipalities (40%) (Table 17).
Thus, the share of provinces and municipalities in total LGU own-source
revenue contracted from an average of 19.9 percent and 37.1 percent, respec-
tively, in 1985-1991, to 12.5 percent and 27.3 percent, respectively, in 1992-2003
(Table 18). In contrast, the share of cities in total LGU own-source revenue
expanded from 40.0 percent in the pre-Code period to 60.2 percent in the post-
Code period. This kind of movement is evident in tax as well as in nontax sources
of own-source revenues.
De jure, the broader powers given cities relative to provinces and mu-
nicipalities is justified by the fact that cities are expected to carry out all the
functions that are assigned to both provinces and municipalities.21  De facto,
however, the cost of devolved functions (specifically those that go with actual
personnel transfer) is heavily skewed in favor of provinces and municipalities
(Table 10). A comparison of Table 18 with Table 10 highlights the inconsis-
tency between tax assignment and expenditure assignment across local gov-
ernment levels.
Distribution of LGU own-source revenues by type. For all LGUs in the ag-
gregate, tax revenues is the major source of own-source revenue, accounting for
66.3 percent of their total own-source revenue in 1985-1991 and 75.7 percent in
1992-2003 (Table 19). While revenues from the real property tax are more important
than those from other taxes for all provinces in the aggregate in the post-Code
period, the opposite is true in the case of municipalities and cities. Moreover, the
increase in the share of other taxes in total own-source revenue of cities and
municipalities is remarkable in the post-Code period.
The bulk of the increase in total own-source revenues of all LGUs in the
aggregate came from tax revenues. Real property revenues rose from 0.5 percent of
GNP in 1985-1991 to 0.9 percent of GNP in 1992-2003 while revenues from other







































0 Table 16. General government revenues by level of local government as percent of GNP
            
 General  Government   National  Government  Local  Government
Levels Total Tax Non-tax  Total Tax Non-tax Total Tax Non-tax
   
1985 13.3 11.6 1.7 12.5 11.1 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.3
1987 16.2 13.4 2.8 15.5 12.9 2.6 0.7 0.5 0.2
1989 17.7 14.0 3.6 16.8 13.5 3.3 0.9 0.5 0.3
1991 18.4 15.1 3.4 17.6 14.5 3.1 0.8 0.6 0.3
1993 18.5 16.3 2.3 17.4 15.3 2.0 1.2 0.9 0.3
1995 19.6 16.7 2.9 18.4 15.9 2.6 1.2 0.9 0.3
1997 20.0 17.3 2.7 18.7 16.3 2.4 1.3 1.0 0.3
1999 16.5 14.7 1.8 15.3 13.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.3
2001 15.7 13.5 2.2 14.5 12.6 1.9 1.1 0.9 0.3
2003 14.8 12.6 2.2 13.6 11.6 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.2
 
Average
1985-1991 16.6 13.6 3.0 15.8 13.1 2.7 0.8 0.5 0.3
1992-2003 16.9 14.7 2.3 15.8 13.8 2.0 1.2 0.9 0.3MANASAN 61
Table 17. Basic real property tax (RPT) rates and sharing of proceeds
LGU Class                          Pre-1991 Code   1991 Code
  RPT Share (%)  RPT Share (%)  
 rate  (%)     rate (%)
Province 0.25<RPT<0.5 Province : 45 RPT<1 Province : 35
  Municipality: 45 Municipality: 40
  City: 0 City: 0
  Barangay: 10 Barangay: 25
Municipality 0.25<RPT<0.5 Province : 45 RPT=0  
  Municipality: 45
  City: 0
  Barangay: 10
City 0.5<RPT<2 Province : 0 RPT<1 Province : 0
  Municipality: 0 Municipality: 0
  City: 90 City: 70
  Barangay: 10 Barangay: 30
Barangay RPT=0    RPT=0    
taxes increased from 0.2 percent to 0.4 percent of GNP (Table 20). In contrast,
revenues from user charges and fees rose from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent of GNP.
The own-source revenue effort for all LGUs in the aggregate showed some
stagnation in the second half of the 1990s (Table 20). This trend is true for all
sources of revenues but is more pronounced among provinces and municipalities
than among cities. However, the positive trend for cities may be attributed more to
the conversion of a good number of municipalities into cities than to their good
performance per se.
When measured relative to GNP, total own-source revenue of provinces
registered a slight contraction in the post-Code period, from an average of 0.16
percent of GNP in 1985-1991 to 0.15 percent in 1992-2003 (Table 20). This is prima-
rily traceable to a decline in their nontax revenue (particularly operating and other
miscellaneous income). The decline in nontax effort of provinces is surprising
given the greater autonomy of LGUs in the setting of fees and user charges.
In contrast, total own-source revenue effort of cities and municipalities rose
from an average of 0.35 percent and 0.30 percent of GNP, respectively, in 1985-1991,
to 0.71 percent and 0.32 percent of GNP, respectively, in 1992-2003 (Table 20). In
cities, all sources of own-source revenues increased in the post-Code period but
the improvement in local tax effort (both RPT and other taxes) was more dramatic.
On the other hand, the expansion in the own-source revenue effort of municipali-








































2 Table 18. Distribution of LGU own-source revenue across levels of local government by type of revenue (in percent)
         LG total own-source revenue               LG total tax revenue                                             LG nontax revenue
 Total Provinces Mun. Cities  Total Provinces Mun. Cities  Total Provinces Mun. Cities
   
1985 100.0 19.5 35.1 45.4 100.0 15.8 36.5 47.7 100.0 27.0 32.3 40.7
1987 100.0 17.4 37.8 44.8 100.0 16.6 36.1 47.3 100.0 19.5 41.6 38.9
1989 100.0 27.4 33.6 39.0 100.0 17.0 36.2 46.8 100.0 43.3 29.7 27.1
1991 100.0 18.4 38.9 42.7 100.0 13.3 40.7 46.0 100.0 28.4 35.5 36.1
1993 100.0 14.0 48.4 37.6 100.0 11.9 49.4 38.7 100.0 21.0 45.1 33.9
1995 100.0 14.8 31.7 53.5 100.0 13.1 29.5 57.4 100.0 19.7 38.3 42.0
1997 100.0 13.3 29.8 56.9 100.0 10.0 27.3 62.7 100.0 22.6 36.9 40.5
1999 100.0 12.8 25.6 61.6 100.0 11.7 21.9 66.3 100.0 16.1 37.1 46.7
2001 100.0 11.9 23.3 64.8 100.0 10.2 20.2 69.6 100.0 17.5 32.9 49.6
2003 100.0 10.1 22.1 67.9 100.0 8.4 18.8 72.8 100.0 16.3 34.4 49.3
Average
1985-1991 100.0 19.9 37.1 43.0 100.0 15.2 38.0 46.8 100.0 29.1 35.3 35.6









Table 19. Distribution of LGU revenue by source (in percent)
                             Average             
ALL LGUS 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
 
TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 I.  Tax Revenues 66.3 75.7 66.3 77.2 75.1 73.9 75.9 75.8 79.0
      Real Property Tax 40.4 38.4 40.8 31.8 38.8 38.4 38.6 39.7 39.7
      Others 25.8 37.4 25.5 45.4 36.3 35.5 37.3 36.1 39.3
II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 31.2 23.7 31.4 22.7 24.7 24.1 23.8 23.7 21.0
III. Capital 2.5 0.6 2.3 0.2 0.3 1.9 0.3 0.6 0.0
                                 Average             
PROVINCES 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
I.  Tax Revenues 50.7 64.6 48.0 65.7 66.7 55.7 69.6 64.5 66.0
      Real Property Tax 40.8 48.9 38.3 47.3 44.2 44.9 48.3 51.2 52.3
      Others 9.9 15.7 9.7 18.5 22.5 10.8 21.3 13.3 13.7
 II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 42.1 32.2 50.4 34.0 32.6 32.8 29.5 31.4 34.0







































4 Table 19 continued
                                 Average              
MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
I.  Tax Revenues 68.0 67.8 69.2 78.7 69.8 67.7 65.1 65.8 67.3
      Real Property Tax 39.6 30.5 41.3 25.7 32.1 30.7 29.1 30.8 30.3
      Others 28.4 37.3 27.9 53.0 37.7 37.0 36.0 35.0 36.9
II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 31.6 31.8 30.1 21.2 29.6 31.3 34.3 34.0 32.7
III. Capital 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.0
   
                           Average
CITIES 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
I.  Tax Revenues 72.1 81.7 71.5 79.4 80.4 81.4 81.7 81.5 84.7
      Real Property Tax 41.0 39.7 41.3 33.8 41.2 41.0 40.5 40.8 40.9
      Others 31.0 41.9 30.1 45.6 39.2 40.4 41.2 40.7 43.8
   
II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 25.9 18.2 24.5 20.4 19.5 18.4 18.2 18.5 15.3
   









Table 20. Revenue effort of all local governments  (Ratio to GNP in  percent)
                               Average             
ALL LGUS 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
 TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 0.81 1.17 0.84 1.18 1.15 1.30 1.20          1.13 1.18
 I.  Tax Revenues 0.53 0.89 0.56 0.91 0.87 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.93
        Real Property Tax 0.33 0.45 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.47
        Others 0.21 0.44 0.21 0.53 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.46
II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25
III. Capital 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00
                               Average             
PROVINCES 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12
I.  Tax Revenues 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08
        Real Property Tax 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
        Others 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
 II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04







































6 Table 20 continued
                                Average             
MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
 TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.57 0.37 0.39 0.31 0.26 0.26
I.  Tax Revenues 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.45 0.26 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.18
        Real Property Tax 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08
        Others 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.10
II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09
III. Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
                           Average
CITIES 1985-1991 1992-2003  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
TOTAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUE 0.35 0.71 0.36 0.44 0.62 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.80
I.  Tax Revenues 0.25 0.58 0.26 0.35 0.50 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.68
        Real Property Tax 0.14 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.33
        Others 0.11 0.30 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.35
 II. Operating & Misc. Revenues 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12
III. Capital 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00MANASAN 67
These differences in the revenue performance of provinces, cities, and mu-
nicipalities may be explained by the differences in their tax bases as well as by the
differences in their taxing powers. Thus, since cities are more urbanized and have
more market-based economies, their tax base tends to be more buoyant compared
to those of municipalities and provinces. However, changes in the own-source
revenue effort of cities may also be explained by the reclassification (i.e., the
conversion) of a significant number of municipalities into cities in more recent
years. A comparison of the revenue effort of the original 60 cities as of the time the
Local Government Code was enacted with the revenue effort of all cities (including
those that have been converted from municipalities into cities following the imple-
mentation of the Code) indicates that almost all of improvement in the revenue
effort of all cities in the aggregate in the last half of the 1990s and early 2000s is due
to the latter factor.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
Legal framework
In the Philippines, central government transfers to subnational governments are
of three types: formula-based block grants (i.e., internal revenue allotment or IRA),
origin-based share in central government revenues (i.e., share in national wealth),
and ad hoc categorical grants. In principle, LGUs have almost full discretion in the
utilization of their IRA. In contrast, the categorical grants are conditioned on their
use for specific purposes.
Internal revenue allotment. While LGUs receive a fixed share of central
government tax revenues (IRA) based on a formula fixed by law, the ARMM’s
share is based on the origin principle. Specifically, said share of subnational gov-
ernments in the IRA is transferred as a block grant and, as such, both the regional
government of the ARMM and the LGUs enjoy considerable discretion in the
utilization of the IRA.
The IRA is allocated to the different levels of local government and to spe-
cific LGUs within each level according to a predetermined formula that is based on
population, land area, and equal sharing. Under the Code, the aggregate IRA of
LGUs is set at 40 percent of actual internal revenue tax collections of the central
government three years prior to the current year. 22
In addition, the IRA is divided among the different levels of local govern-
ment as follows:  23 percent to provinces, 23 percent to cities, 34 percent to munici-
22 The share of LGUs in national taxes was equal to 20 percent of internal revenue taxes at the maximum
in the pre-Code regime. The amount of IRA appropriated in the pre-Code era was 13 percent of net BIR
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palities, and 20 percent to barangays.23  In turn, the IRA share of each tier of local
government is then apportioned to individual LGUs on the basis of population (50
percent), land area (25 percent), and equal sharing (25 percent).24
Meanwhile, actual collections of internal revenue taxes in the ARMM area
are divided as follows: 30 percent to the central government, 35 percent to the
regional government, and 35 percent to the local governments in the region
(distributed to each according to the derivation principle).25  The collecting
agent (in this case the regional office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue) auto-
matically remits to the regional government the latter’s share of the regional
government together with those of its constituent LGUs. Thus, LGUs in the
ARMM are not only entitled to their share of national taxes as defined under the
Local Government Code but also to their share as provided for under the Organic
Act of the ARMM.
On the other hand, while the Code provides for the automatic release of the
IRA, the IRA has emerged to be a highly unpredictable source of financing for
LGUs since 1998 as the central government, faced with severe fiscal constraints,
persistently reduced the amount of intergovernmental transfers to LGUs as man-
dated by the Code (Table 21). For instance, in 1998, 5 percent of the IRA was not
released to LGUs on the basis of a fiscal austerity measure implemented by the
DBM.26  A case questioning the legality of the central government’s action in this
23 Prior to the implementation of the Code, the intertier allocation of the IRA was 27 percent to provinces,
22 percent to cities, 41 percent to municipalities, and 10 percent to barangays.
24 In the pre-Code period, the intratier allocation to individual LGUs was determined as follows: 70 percent
based on population, 20 percent based on land area, and 10 percent based on the principle of equal sharing.
25 Prior to the amendment of the Organic Act of the ARMM in 2001, the share of the central government
was 40 percent; the regional government, 30 percent; and the provinces or cities, 30 percent.
26 Initially, 10 percent of the IRA was withheld by the DBM. However, toward the end of the year, the DBM
announced that it would release half of the remaining portion.
Table 21. Comparison of IRA appropriations and IRA obligations (in billion pesos)
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
(1)  Mandated IRA share
       40% of net BIR revenues 3 years back 81.3 100.9 121.8 131.9 134.4 141.0 150.3
(2)  Appropriations 81.0 96.8 111.8a 111.8 134.4 141.0 141.0
(3) Obligations 76.9 95.3 114.3b 115.8 134.4 141.0 141.0
 (1) Less (3) 4.4 5.6 7.5 16.1 0.0 0.0 9.3
a P10 billion of the P121.8 billion mandated share was put under “unprogrammed funds” by a member of
the Senate.
b In the course of the budget year, P2.5 billion was transferred from the “unprogrammed fund” to the
“programmed” portion of the budget.MANASAN 69
regard was brought to the Supreme Court, which subsequently ruled in favor of
LGUs. However, this did not deter the central government from continuing its raid
of the LGUs’ IRA share.
In 2000, Congress lopped off P10 billion from the mandated IRA share of
LGUs and placed it under Unprogrammed Funds (i.e., appropriations that will only
be released when revenues in excess of targets are realized). In that year, DBM also
required LGUs to submit their Annual Investment Plans prior to releasing 20 per-
cent of the individual LGU’s IRA. This was seen as an attempt to delay the release
of the IRA and thus reduce the central government’s fiscal deficit.
In 2001, the IRA was effectively reduced by P16 billion relative to its
mandated share when the government had to operate on the basis of a re-
enacted budget (i.e., the previous year’s appropriations) because of the failure
of Congress to enact a new General Appropriations Act (GAA) on time.27 In
2003, LGUs lost another P9 billion of its mandated IRA share due to the re-
enactment of the budget.
Categorical grants. Categorical grants to LGUs come from various sources:
(1) lump sum allocations for the same under the GAA of various years; (2) alloca-
tions made by central government sector agencies from their own budgets; and (3)
lump sum and/or line item appropriations for pork barrel funds of legislators.
In the 1998 and 1999 GAA, for instance, there are three major lump sum
funds that finance the implementation of devolved activities supportive of major
national government programs. These are the Local Government Service Equaliza-
tion Fund (LGSEF), the Local Government Empowerment Fund (LGEF), and the
Municipal Development Fund (MDF).28
The principal difference among these funding sources stems from (1) the
nature of the fund transfers and (2) the agencies that administers them. Both the
LGEF and the LGSEF are comprised exclusively of grant funds. In contrast, the
MDF includes funds for both loans and grants.
The LGSEF was created by virtue of Executive Order 48 of 1998 and, conse-
quently, the 1999 and the 2000 GAA earmarked P5 billion that was carved out of the
aggregate IRA share of LGUs. The LGSEF was originally designed to provide
equalization grants to LGUs.29 However, many LGUs officials resent the fact that
the money for the LGSEF was taken from the IRA, thus diminishing what they
27 The reduction would have been P20 billion had the DBM not released the P4 billion it withheld in 1998
(per Supreme Court ruling).
28 The LGSEF has been discontinued since 2000 but both the LGEF and MDF are still operational to date.
However, the LGSEF is discussed here because it is one of the first attempts to address equalization
concerns.
29 The LGSEF was meant to provide grant funds to support affirmative action projects of LGUs belonging
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interpret to be theirs as a matter of entitlement.  Because of this, the implementa-
tion of LGSEF has been short-lived.
The LGEF provided a budget cover for foreign-assisted projects supportive
of major national government programs in the 21 priority provinces and in the fifth-
and sixth-class LGUs identified under the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) of the
Ramos administration. For instance, the list of projects under the LGEF in the 2002
GAA includes: (1) the Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resource Management
Project of the DA and the DENR; (2) the Rural Water Supply, Sewerage and Sani-
tation Project of the DILG and the DOH; and (3) the Integrated Community Health
Services Project of the DOH.
In addition to the LGSEF and the LGEF, many sector agencies implement
matching grants programs out of their own budgets under the GAA. These pro-
grams are aimed at encouraging LGUs to fund and undertake activities that sup-
port national programs and objectives. The Matching Grants Program of the DOH
for the promotion of family planning is an example. Generally, LGUs have to apply
for the grant and, if they qualify, are required to open a special bank account that
will be used to track and implement the grant funds and the LGU counterpart.
Initially, many LGUs had no difficulty providing counterpart funding sup-
port to Official Development Assisstance (ODA)-assisted and/or NG-assisted
projects. This situation appears to be changing as the convergence of a number of
these projects in the same LGUs has put a strain on their absorptive capacity.
Moreover, the so-called SRA provinces that are targeted by many of these projects
are inherently less financially capable to start with.30
The rationale for the continued involvement of central government agencies
in devolved activities has to be revisited. While this issue appears to have waned
given the current fiscal difficulties faced by the government, it is likely to recur
when the fiscal position of the central government improves.31 On one hand, there
appears to be some justification for matching grants in cases of activities that have
significant benefit spillovers across LGU jurisdictions since LGUs tend to
underprovide these services in the absence of national government grants. On the
other hand, there is a need to evaluate these expenditures given the propensity of
national agency bureaucrats to continue to implement devolved activities.
In contrast, the MDF is a facility for channeling the proceeds of various
loans that the central government has obtained from foreign governments and
30 Thus, there appears to be some tension between equity and efficiency considerations, or more
specifically some tradeoff between the need to focus on the most needy LGUs and the need to encourage
LGUs to take fuller responsibility over devolved activities.
31 Note that not all of the budgets that sector agencies have for devolved activities are transferred as grants
to LGUs. In many instances, the funds are used for the direct provision of devolved services by the
central government agency concerned.MANASAN 71
multilateral institutions. ODA funds intended for LGUs are first appropriated and
allotted to the MDF. The MDF then releases said funds in the form of loans and/or
grants to LGUs. The MDF prescribes a loan/equity/grant mix in the financing of
varying types of LGU projects depending on the income type of the LGU con-
cerned. For instance, other things being equal, the grant share of lower income
LGUs is larger than that of higher income ones (correspondingly, the equity and
the loan shares of poorer LGUs are smaller than those of their better off counter-
parts). On the other hand, other things being equal, the grant share is highest for
social projects and blue/green (marine- and forest-related) environmental projects,
followed by brown (waste management) environmental projects and revenue-gen-
erating ones.
One of the issues relating to the current operation of the MDF is the need to
unbundle grants from loans. It is argued that decisions involving the grant system
should be isolated from the credit system. An LGU that has access to a grant
should not be automatically given access to a loan facility, and vice versa. The
reasons for providing grants are distinct from those for giving loans. Grants to
LGUs are typically justified on economic efficiency (e.g., existence of externalities)
and equity grounds while loans to LGUs depend on their creditworthiness. Un-
bundling does not mean that an LGU cannot access both sources of financing at
the same time. What is critical here is the separate and independent evaluation of
the grant and the loan application of LGUs.
The present system (by prescribing a loan-equity-grant mix for various types
of projects) effectively results in a subsidized credit program even if the credit
component is priced at market rates of interest. Such a situation tends to promote
continued LGU dependence on subsidized credit while easing out private capital
in the LGU credit market (Llanto et al. 1998). There has been some attempt to move
the administration of all central government grant transfers to LGUs to an agency
other than the MDFO (e.g., the DBM, the DOF after the latter has shed off the
MDFO, or the MDFO itself if it spins off its credit function) but concerns about
turf muddled up concerns about grant policy. Thus the proposal was shelved.32
Size and composition of central government transfers to LGUs
Since the implementation of the Local Government Code, there has been a remark-
able increase in the size of central government transfers to LGUs as well as a
palpable shift in their composition. For instance, central government transfers to
LGUs surged from 5.4 percent of national government revenues (or 4.6% of na-
32 Refer to the ADB Technical Assistance for Strengthening Public Finance and Planning in Local
Government Units (TA No. 3145-PHI), which focuses on the continuing provision of decentralized
services by national government agencies and the need to increase the quantity of development
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tional government expenditures or 0.9% of GNP) in 1985-1991 to 14.5 percent of
national government revenues (or 12.3% of national government expenditures or
2.3% of GNP) in 1992-2003 (Table 22). This development has been a source of
increasing pressure on national government expenditures in recent years.
On the other hand, there has been a movement away from ad hoc grants in
favor of formula-based block grants in the post-Code period. In particular, the
share of the IRA in total central government transfers to LGUs rose from 71.4
percent in 1985-1991 to 99.0 percent in 1992-2003 while the share of ad hoc grants
declined from 28.6 percent to 1.0 percent (Figure 2).
Conversely, while the hefty increase in the IRA relative to LGU revenues and
LGU expenditures following the implementation of the Code is well known, the
total central government transfers did not increase by as much as the IRA in the
post-Code period (Table 23). This occurred as ad hoc grants declined to less than
1 percent of total LGU revenue in 1992-2003 from 14.7 percent in 1985-1991.
Consistency of revenue and expenditure assignment across levels of local
government: adequacy of the IRA
As in other countries, there is a mismatch between revenue means and expenditure
needs of various levels of local government in the Philippines. Many types of
taxes are either easier to administer at the central level or are deemed to be unsuit-
able for local subnational government imposition because their tax bases are geo-
graphically mobile. The principle of subsidiarity implies that many functions are
best assigned to local governments. In this context, intergovernmental transfers
are generally viewed as an instrument that may be used to correct the imbalance in
the tax and expenditure assignment.
In the case of the Philippines, LGUs have become increasingly dependent
on the IRA. Thus, the contribution of the IRA to total LGU income net of borrow-
ings surged from 38.0 percent in 1985-1991 to 65.1 percent in 1992-2003 for all LGUs
combined (Table 23). This trend is more dramatic among provinces and municipali-
ties than among cities. In particular, the share of the IRA in total income net of









Table 22. IRA and other grants as a portion of national revenues, national expenditures, and GNP
NG transfers as NG transfers as
percent of NG revenue percent of NG expenditure Percent to GNP
Total IRA Other grants Total IRA Other grants Total IRA Other grants
1985 5.9 4.8 1.1 5.0 4.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.1
1987 3.9 3.2 0.6 3.2 2.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1
1989 4.9 3.3 1.6 4.8 3.2 1.6 0.8 0.6 0.3
1991 5.8 4.3 1.5 5.2 3.8 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.3
1993 10.1 9.8 0.2 9.5 9.2 0.2 1.7 1.7 0.0
1995 11.8 11.6 0.2 11.5 11.3 0.2 2.2 2.1 0.0
1997 12.1 12.0 0.1 11.6 11.5 0.1 2.3 2.2 0.0
1999 16.0 15.9 0.1 13.2 13.1 0.1 2.4 2.4 0.0
2001 15.7 15.5 0.1 12.5 12.4 0.1 2.3 2.3 0.0
2003 18.4 18.3 0.1 13.9 13.9 0.1 2.5 2.5 0.0
Average
1985-1991 5.4 3.9 1.6 4.6 3.3 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.2
1992-2003 14.5 14.3 0.1 12.3 12.2 0.1 2.3 2.3 0.0PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 74
borrowings of provinces expanded from 38.8 percent in the pre-Code period to 81.3
percent in the post-Code period. The corresponding figure for municipalities rose
from 38.3 percent to 74.1 percent while that for cities increased from 33.2 percent to
47.0 percent.
Vertical imbalance.33  The mismatch between the revenue means and the
expenditure needs of various levels of local government may be measured by
comparing the subnational government’s share in general government revenues
with its share in general government expenditures (Shah 1994). Table 24 shows
that the vertical fiscal imbalance (before transfers) has worsened at all levels of
local government with the implementation of the Local Government Code. Thus,
the fiscal deficiency for all LGUs in the aggregate grew from 6.7 percent in 1985-
1991 to 16.9 percent in 1992-2003. Furthermore, transfers have not fully closed the
vertical fiscal imbalance in both periods.
While the vertical fiscal imbalance after the IRA was trimmed down to less
than 4 percent in 1998-2000, it has went up to 6.9 percent in 2001 and more than 4
percent in 2003 because of additional unfunded mandates (Table 24). This reso-
nates with widespread perception that a vertical imbalance exists in the sense that
33 The following discussion refers to the vertical imbalance in LGUs in general. The vertical balance issue
in the case of the ARMM is discussed in Box 3.
Table 23. IRA and other grants as a portion of total LGU income and LGU expenditure
(in percent)
  NG transfers as % of     NG transfers as %
  LGU total income     of LGU expenditure
All LGUs Total IRA Other  Total IRA Other
     grants    grants
   
1985 48.0 39.1 8.9 47.5 38.7 8.8
1987 44.8 37.7 7.1 41.6 35.0 6.6
1989 48.9 32.7 16.1 53.6 35.9 17.7
1991 55.0 40.5 14.5 54.5 40.1 14.3
1993 59.7 58.2 1.5 64.1 62.5 1.6
1995 65.3 64.2 1.1 61.7 60.6 1.1
1997 62.9 62.4 0.6 60.0 59.5 0.5
1999 67.0 66.6 0.4 66.7 66.3 0.4
2001 66.7 66.1 0.6 60.7 60.2 0.5
2003 67.6 67.2 0.4 72.7 72.3 0.4
 
Average
1985-1991 51.4 36.7 14.7 53.2 38.0 15.2
1992-2003 66.0 65.3 0.6 65.8 65.1 0.6MANASAN 75
Table 24. Indicator of vertical imbalance, with and without IRA
  Ratio of own- Ratio of own- Ratio of LGU Surplus/ Surplus/
 source  revenue source  revenue expenditure to (Deficit) - (Deficit) -
ALL LGUs to general plus IRA to general gov’t without with the
 gov’t general  gov’t expenditure net the IRA IRA
 revenue revenue of  debt service    
 %%% % %
   
1985 5.62 9.88 12.01 -6.39 -2.13
1987 4.36 7.35 10.55 -6.20 -3.21
1989 4.63 7.61 11.10 -6.47 -3.50
1991 4.31 8.20 12.65 -8.33 -4.44
1993 5.81 14.20 19.99 -14.18 -5.79
1995 5.30 15.14 21.85 -16.54 -6.71
1997 5.86 15.89 21.47 -15.61 -5.57
1999 6.36 19.21 23.05 -16.69 -3.84
2001 6.32 18.89 25.73 -19.41 -6.85
2003 6.85 21.21 25.41 -18.56 -4.20
 
Average  
1985-1991 4.62 8.13 11.30 -6.67 -3.17
1992-2003 6.09 17.85 22.96 -16.87 -5.12
Box 3. Vertical imbalance in the case of local government units in
general
Vertical balance in the ARMM. Under RA 6734, the share of the regional government of the
ARMM in national taxes is determined according to the derivation principle. In other words, the
regional government of the ARMM and its component LGUs share in the actual collections of
internal revenue taxes collected from the region. The sharing is as follows: 30 percent to the
central government, 35 percent to the regional government itself, and 35 percent to the local
governments in the region (also distributed to each one of them according to the derivation
principle). The collecting agent (in this case the regional office of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue) automatically remits to the regional government the latter’s share of the regional
government together with those of its constituent LGUs. Like the IRA, these transfers are
block grants.
RA 6734 and the Local Government Code, in combination, have resulted in a severe vertical
fiscal imbalance in the ARMM as there has been a mismatch between the expenditure respon-
sibilities that were transferred and the revenue means of the subnational government. On the
one hand, the regional government’s share in internal revenue taxes is not sufficient to cover
the expenditure responsibilities assigned to it. In particular, the share of the regional govern-
ment in internal revenue taxes is equivalent to about 3 percent of the cost of the devolved
functions.
This occurs largely because the ARMM’s share in national taxes is computed on a derivation
basis. Precisely because the ARMM is a less developed region, its tax base is lower than thePHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 76
average tax base of the country in general. However, the problem also partly stems from the
fact that all of the responsibilities devolved by the central government are shifted to the
regional government, with none being assigned to the LGUs in the area despite the fact that
RA 6734 allows the regional government to devolve their functions to the LGUs.a
As a result, the regional government of ARMM is dependent on yearly allocations from the
central government’s general appropriations to carry out its mandate. The regional govern-
ment has very little control over the size and composition of this funding. To wit, the size of this
direct funding support is entirely dependent on the central government while the ARMM
competes for these resources like any other central government agencies. Also, the allocation
of the said transfers to various uses is predetermined by the central government as these are
represented by line items in the General Appropriations Act. As such, the regional government
is reduced to an administrative arm of the central government by simply implementing the
latter’s plans and programs.
Since 1992, central government transfers to the regional government has grown at a faster
pace than what would have been necessary if one were simply making appropriate adjust-
ments for inflation and population growth. In fact, central government allotment for the
ARMM’s regular operations is about twice the amount that used to be spent in the region. This
may have been the central government’s way of making up for its neglect of the region’s
needs in the past, which detracted from the region’s fiscal autonomy.
It should also be emphasized that LGUs in the ARMM are entitled not only to their IRA share
as mandated by the Local Government Code but also to their share in internal revenue
collections in the ARMM as mandated by RA 6734. Consequently, the aggregate intergovern-
mental transfer accruing to ARMM LGUs is more than 20 times that of the regional government
itself. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the regional government has not devolved any expendi-
ture responsibility to its component LGU. Thus, ARMM LGUs get the resources but not the
expenditure responsibilities
a Note, however, that even if one adds the IRA share of ARMM LGUs to the share of the
regional government in internal revenue taxes, the sum would still be substantially lower than
the cost of functions devolved to the ARMM.
the LGUs’ prevailing share in national taxes is deficient to cover both the cost of
devolved functions and the cost of the so-called unfunded mandates despite the
significant increase in the IRA share of LGUs under the Code. These unfunded
mandates include the salary increases under the Salary Standardization Law, the
additional personnel benefits under the Magna Carta for Health Workers, and the
additional number of mandatory positions as well as the sectoral representation
mandated under the Local Government Code.
A matching of the aggregate IRA levels with LGU expenditure responsi-
bilities (including devolved functions, additional mandatory positions, un-
funded mandates, and the budgetary requirement for the 20% development
fund) in 1993, 1994, and 1995 shows that while the concern about the vertical
balance was not justified in the aggregate in those years, the period 1996-1998
presents a different picture as the salary adjustments under the Salary Stan-MANASAN 77
34 The analysis underlying Table 25 is limited by the fact that, in the computation, the cost of devolved
functions refers only to the cost of personnel and facilities that were actually transferred to the LGUs as
well as the maintenance and operating expenses associated with the said devolved facilities. There are
cases, however, where functions were transferred to LGUs without any corresponding devolution of
personnel and facilities from the central government. This is true in the case of public works and, to some
extent, environmental and natural resource management. In this sense, the estimates of the cost of new
LGU expenditure responsibilities used in this analysis would tend to underestimate their true cost and,
consequently, overestimate the vertical balance for all LGUs in the aggregate. Moreover, the cost used
in the estimation refers to the cost of the devolved functions as budgeted by the central government prior
to devolution. As such, they do not necessarily reflect local preferences. These notwithstanding, the
analysis is still useful in looking at the vertical balance problem from the perspective of provinces, cities,
and municipalities.
35 The mandated increase in salaries of government employees during this period was moderate
compared to the earlier period. However, it should be emphasized that the estimates used in the latter
period did not include the newer mandate given to LGUs with respect to paying for the health insurance
premiums of indigent residents.
36 The net resource transfer for any given year is computed as the difference between the IRA for said year,
on the one hand, and the sum of the adjusted cost of devolved functions, cost of other mandates including
the provision for the 20 percent Development Fund and sectoral representation, and 1992 IRA, on the other
hand. Adjustments on the cost side were made to take into account population growth and inflation.
37 Barangays received P1.5 billion in Barangay Administration Fund under the National Assistance to
Local Government Units (NALGU) in 1991. This assistance, which was used to pay for the salaries of
barangay officials, was discontinued with the implementation of the Local Government Code. As a result,
barangays have to pay those salaries from their own IRAs.
dardization Law were so hefty that the increases in the IRA were not able to
keep up with the rising cost of devolved functions and unfunded mandates
and the increased pressure for additional expenditures due to population growth
(Table 25).34 A parallel analysis for 1999-2003 indicates that the increase in IRA
was more than sufficient to fully cover the inflation, population growth, and salary
adjustments in the cost of devolved functions for all LGUs combined.35
Moreover, variations in net resource transfer36 across levels of local govern-
ment are substantial. Table 25 shows that, in the aggregate, the net resource
transfer for cities is consistently larger than those for provinces and municipali-
ties. While the net resource transfer has consistently been positive for cities in
1995-2003, those for provinces were negative in 1995-1999 and 2001. In contrast,
while the net resource of municipalities was also negative in 1995-1999, they turned
positive in 2000-2003. This analysis suggests that provinces and municipalities in
the aggregate are relative net losers while cities were relative net winners from
fiscal decentralization.  It is easy to see why.
Provinces absorbed 37.0 percent of the total cost of devolved functions; mu-
nicipalities, 38.5 percent; cities, 5.7 percent; and barangays, 18.8 percent.37  When this
is contrasted with the mandated share of LGUs in the IRA (provinces, 23%; cities, 23%;
municipalities, 34%;  and barangays, 20%), it becomes immediately clear that there is a
mismatch in the resources transferred and the cost of additional expenditure responsi-
bilities that were devolved to the different levels of local government.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 78
Table 25. Matching of IRA and LGU responsibilities, 1995-2000
Province Cities Municipalities All LGUs
1995
Aggregate Net Resource (0.320) 2.692 (0.114) 2.258
    Transfer (in billion pesos) a  
Number of LGUs with Negative 48 0 983  
   Per Capita Net Resource Transfer   
1997  
Aggregate Net Resource (1.569) 1.501 (2.231) (2.299)
    Transfer (in billion pesos) b
Number of LGUs with Negative 58 12 1,327  
   Per Capita Net Resource Transfer
1998  
Aggregate Net Resource (2.743) 0.052 (3.029) (5.72)
    Transfer (in billion pesos) c
Number of LGUs with Negative 65 35 1,336
   Per Capita Net Resource Transfer
1999
Aggregate Net Resource (0.745) 2.746 (0.312) 1.689
    Transfer (in billion pesos) d
Number of LGUs with Negative 50 28 893
    Per Capita Net Resource Transfer
2000  
Aggregate Net Resource 0.115 5.052 1.555 6.722
    Transfer (in billion pesos) e
Number of LGUs with Negative 38 11 684
   Per Capita Net Resource Transfer
2001
Aggregate Net Resource (0.139) 4.692 0.284 4.837
    Transfer (in billion pesos) f
Number of LGUs with Negative 45 17 772
   Per Capita Net Resource Transfer
2002
Aggregate Net Resource 3.548 7.989 8.073 19.610
    Transfer (in billion pesos) f
Number of LGUs with Negative 12 18 141
    Per Capita Net Resource Transfer
2003
Aggregate Net Resource 4.040 8.830 8.811 21.681
    Transfer (in billion pesos) f
Number of LGUs with Negative 12 15 68
    Per Capita Net Resource Transfer        
    
Source: 1995-1998 results from Manasan (2001); 1999-2000 re-estimated to reflect actual develop-
ments in IRA in those years.
Note: See Appendix A for footnotes.MANASAN 79
This imbalance may be traced to the fact that the IRA distribution formula
was decided much earlier (i.e., during the Congressional debate on the Code) than
the actual assignment of functions (including the devolution of personnel) to
different levels of local government.  Some observers note that this skewed distri-
bution may reflect the perception that governors are a more common threat to
congressmen than are mayors since congressmen represent either congressional
districts that are coterminous with the boundaries of a single province or one of
many districts within a single province. While mayors pose similar threats to some
congressmen, there are fewer big city mayors than there are governors and most
legislators represent districts without highly urbanized cities in them. Thus, by
making provinces responsible for more services than they could pay for with
automatic revenue transfers, Congress ensured that governors would remain de-
pendent on legislators, who could subsequently offer their services as brokers of
additional revenues from the center in (Eaton 2001).38
In sum. Finance did not follow function. The discussion in Section 3.2 and
Section 4.2 shows that this is true when one compares the expenditure responsi-
bilities assigned to LGUs with the own-source revenue authorities that are vested
on them under the Code. This is also certainly true for all LGUs in the aggregate
in 1995-1999 when one compares the additional revenues from the IRA with the
cost of devolved functions. While the vertical imbalance does not appear to be
a problem in 2000-2003, the actual picture in those years seems less optimistic
than that shown in Table 25 if one takes into account the cost of devolved
functions, which did not involve the actual transfer of personnel from the na-
tional government agencies to LGUs and the newer expenditure mandate of
LGUs with regard to the financing of the health insurance premiums of indigent
residents. Clearly, there is a need to improve the IRA distribution formula so that
the varying fiscal capacities of the various levels of local government match
their expenditure needs more closely.
38 When the Code was being debated in Congress, the attitude of congressmen toward decentralization
was ambiguous. Many of them felt threatened, knowing that true local autonomy would reduce their
political clout over their respective constituents (who heretofore were largely dependent on projects
identified by the congressmen and funded from pork barrel funds) as local government politicians become
more powerful with the higher revenue share and expanded expenditure responsibility with fiscal
decentralization. On the other hand, many congressmen maintain fraternal relations with local officials as
Philippine local politics tends to be dominated by political dynasties. Thus, it is not uncommon to find cities
(or provinces) where the mayor (or governor) is the congressman's wife (or brother/sister/father/son).
Thus, in agreeing to decentralize revenues and expenditures, the congressmen then tried to protect
against what they feared most about decentralization.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 80
Impact of intergovernmental fiscal structure on horizontal fiscal balance
In addition to the vertical imbalance across levels of local government, an imbal-
ance also exists across LGUs within each level. Thus, while the increase in the IRA
share of some LGUs is not enough to finance the functions devolved to them,
others have received resources beyond their requirements. For instance, in 2001,
per capita net resource transfer was negative in 45 (57%) out of 79 provinces, in
772 (52%) out of 1,494 municipalities, and in 17 (15%) out of 113 cities (Table 25).39
When all LGUs are aggregated at the provincial level, per capita IRA is
found to be positively related to per capita household income in 1995-1999, sug-
gesting that the IRA distribution formula has been counter-equalizing vis-à-vis
the fiscal capacities of LGUs (Table 26). In contrast, the IRA was found to be
equalizing in 2000 (as indicated by the negative correlation coefficient between per
capita IRA and per capita household income in that year).40 Categorical grants are
also found to have played an equalizing role in 1998-2000. However, even in 2000,
the combined equalizing effect of the IRA and categorical grants was not sufficient
to compensate for the inherent disparities in the tax base (as indicated by the
positive correlation coefficient between the per capita household income and the
sum of the LGUs’ per capita own-source revenue and per capita IRA aggregated at
the provincial level in Table 26).
Some variation in the equalization character of the IRA distribution for-
mula is evident across levels of local government. Thus, while the correlation
coefficient between per capita IRA and per capita household income of city
governments is consistently negative throughout the period 1995-2000, it is
positive in the case of provinces.41 This indicates that that the existing IRA
distribution formula has had some success in equalizing the fiscal capacities of
cities but not in the case of provinces and municipalities. Nonetheless, the
equalizing effect of the IRA in the case of cities is not enough to counteract the
large disparities in their tax base.
In this regard, the literature on fiscal decentralization suggests that future
amendments to the Code should look more closely into the inclusion of equaliza-
tion grants that are designed to help reduce disparities in revenue capacities (or
39 Per capita net resource transfer in 2000 is defined as per capita 2000 IRA less per capita 1992 IRA less
per capita cost of devolved functions adjusted for inflation.
40 The difference in the sign of the correlation coefficient between per capita IRA and per capita household
income in the years 1995 to 1999, on the one hand, and the year 2000, on the other, suggests that the
implementation of the LGSEF scheme in 1999-2000 may have resulted in some equalization. Note that the
LGSEF provided additional transfers to lower income class LGUs in 1999-2000. Also, the LGSEF
transfers were treated as part of the IRA in the financial statements of LGUs.
41 In the case of municipalities, the correlation coefficient is found to be negative in 1999-2000 but positive
in other years, indicating that the implementation of the LGSEF scheme did have some equalization effect
on municipalities.MANASAN 81
Table 26. Simple correlation coefficient between the per capita transfer and per capita
household income
ALL LGUS AGGREGATED 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
  AT  PROVINCIAL  LEVEL         
   
PC IRA w/ PC Household Income -0.08 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.00 -0.02
PC Grants w/ PC Household Income 0.38 -0.05 0.12 0.15 -0.12 -0.01 -0.10
PC OSR + PC IRA w/ PC Household Income 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.16 0.14
PC OSR + PC IRA + PCGRANTS w/  
PC Household Income 0.40 0.22 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.16 0.14
PC OSR w/ PC Household Income 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.53 0.61 0.59 0.61
PROVINCES 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
   
PC IRA w/ PC Household Income 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.06 0.05
PC Grants w/ PC Household Income 0.40 -0.11 0.14 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.03
PC OSR + PC IRA w/ PC Household Income 0.27 0.21 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.13 0.10
PC OSR + PC IRA + PCGRANTS w/  
PC Household Income 0.38 0.21 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.13 0.10
PC OSR w/ PC Household Income 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.52
   
CITIES 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 
PC IRA w/ PC Household Income -0.38 -0.41 -0.38 -0.43 -0.46 -0.57 -0.55
PC Grants w/ PC Household Income 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.02
PC LSR + PC IRA w/ PC Household Income 0.31 0.32 0.49 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.28
PC LSR + PC IRA + PCGRANTS w/  
     PC Household Income 0.28 0.30 0.48 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.28
PC OSR w/ PC Household Income 0.61 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.69 0.69
   
MUNCIPALITIES BY PROVINCIAL LEVEL 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 
PC IRA w/ PC Household Income -0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.12 -0.08 -0.11
PC Grants w/ PC Household Income 0.20 -0.11 0.02 0.33 -0.02 0.09 0.01
PC LSR + PC IRA w/ PC Household Income 0.68 0.29 0.09 0.36 0.43 0.21 0.18
PC LSR + PC IRA + PCGRANTS w/  
    PC Household Income 0.59 0.29 0.09 0.37 0.43 0.21 0.18
PC OSR PC Household Income 0.81 0.71 0.42 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.83
alternatively, the net fiscal capacities, i.e., revenue means less expenditure needs)
among individual LGUs.
Impact of intergovernmental fiscal structure on revenue mobilization
Earlier studies shows that while intergovernmental transfers had a neutral effect
on local revenue performance in 1985 (prior to the Code), it substituted for local taxPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 82
revenues in all levels of local governments in 1992 and 1993 (Manasan 1995).
Using panel data of provinces, cities, and municipalities for 1995-2000,
regression analysis of per capita local tax revenues on per capita household
income42 (as a proxy for the local tax base) and per capita IRA (as a way to check
whether intergovernmental grants stimulates or substitutes for local government
revenue effort) reconfirms the disincentive effect of the IRA on local tax effort in
the post-Code period. The results show that LGUs that were net winners in the
fiscal decentralization tended to have lower per capita local tax revenue (as indi-
cated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the product of the
dummy variable for the sign of the per capita net resource transfer and per capita
IRA in both the real property tax and the local business tax equations of provinces
and in real property tax equations of cities).43  Similarly, the coefficient of per capita
IRA itself is negative and statistically significant in the local business tax equation
of cities. These findings suggest that LGUs that received higher IRA (whether in
absolute terms or relative to their expenditure responsibilities) tended to be lax in
their tax effort. Thus, there appears to be a need to alter the IRA distribution
formula to provide incentives for local tax effort.
Consistent with a priori expectations, the analysis also shows that per
capita local tax revenue is positively and significantly related to per capita house-
hold income for both real property tax and local business tax for cities, munici-
palities, and provinces alike in 1995-2000 (Table 27). This finding confirms that
local tax effort is largely determined by the ability to pay.  Given the wide dispari-
ties in the distribution of the local tax base across regions, this result further
highlights the potential for increased regional inequality with greater fiscal de-




Overall, the devolution of expenditure responsibilities to subnational governments
is consistent with the decentralization theorem. One important exception to the
application of this principle in the Philippines is education. Although the con-
struction and maintenance of school buildings was devolved to LGUs under the
Code, the primary responsibility for the provision of education remains with the
42 Household income data presented here were obtained from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey
of the National Statistics Office.
43 In the regression analysis, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the LGU has a positive per
capita net resource transfer due to the fiscal decentralization  (and zero, otherwise) is introduced to check
whether net winners behave differently from the net losers. Net resource transfer is defined as the









Table 27. Regression of per capita tax revenue of LGUs a
  Province   Cities   Municipalities b  
  PCLBT b  PCRPT  b   PCLBT  c  PCRPT  b   PCLBT  PCRPT  
   
Constant -17.246 -17.980 -0.886 -241.829 -15.072 -16.392  
 (-2.91) (-3.82) (-0.25) (-2.25) (-5.38) (-5.26)  
 Density -0.360 0.204 0.213 0.005 0.468 0.490  
 (-1.48) * (1.05) (2.19) ** (1.35) * (3.45) ** (3.24)  **
PCFIESY 2.128 2.155 0.732 0.015 1.289 1.399  
 (3.67) ** (4.62) ** (3.26) ** (6.68) ** (4.47) ** (4.36)   **
PCIRA -0.384 -0.163 -0.469 0.114 0.504 0.538  
 (-1.03) (-0.55) (-1.63) ** (1.72) ** (1.74) ** (1.66)   **
D1*PCIRA -0.102 -0.070 -0.080  
 (-1.70) ** (-1.45) * (-1.36) *  
 X2(Chi-square) 4.83 10.66 40.78 22.13 25.77 23.69  
a Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-statistics.
b Follows double log specification.
c Follows linear specification.
*   Statistically significant at 10%.
**  Statistically significant at 5%.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 84
central government. In contrast, the experience in many countries shows that
devolving education could possibly improve production efficiency. A review of
this specific expenditure assignment may be warranted.
While Section 17(b) of the Local Government Code provides a clear delinea-
tion of functions across levels of government, Sections 17(c), which deals with
nationally funded devolved activities, and Section 17(f), which focuses on na-
tional government augmentation of devolved services, obfuscate what initially
appears to be a clear-cut assignment of expenditure responsibilities.
The Code must be revisited to clarify the assignment of expenditure respon-
sibilities across local government levels. In particular, Section 17(c) and 17(f) of
the Code has to be re-examined hand in hand with a review of the distribution
formula of the IRA. This would require a careful re-assessment of the need for
continued funding of devolved activities by national government agencies as well
as LGU budgetary support of local offices (and employees) of many national
government agencies. Also, the imposition of unfunded mandates that are not
associated with compensating funding transfers to LGUs should be avoided in the
future. In addition, the devolution of functions from the regional government of
the ARMM to the ARMM‘s LGUs should be encouraged.
Three major trends in LGU expenditure are a major source of concern.
First, aggregate LGU spending on the social services sector registered a gen-
eral upward trend in 1991-2007 when expressed as a percent of GNP and in real
per capita terms. However, some stagnation (especially with respect to health
expenditures) is evident in 1998-2003 when either of these measures is used.
These movements are common across all levels of local government and ap-
pear to be related to the fiscal difficulties LGUs faced when their IRA was not
released in full in the late 1990s at the same time that they suffered from a
decline in their own-source revenue. This development is worrisome consider-
ing that LGUs are primarily responsible for the delivery of basic health ser-
vices. It also highlights the need to design grants that will help ensure that
LGUs are able to deliver health and education services that at least meet the
minimum service standards.
Second, LGU spending on transportation and communication contracted
from 0.5 percent of GNP in 1991 to 0.4 percent of GNP in 2003 despite the devolu-
tion of the responsibility for local infrastructure to LGUs. This decline masks even
larger reductions in the infrastructure spending of provincial and municipal gov-
ernments.  These developments appear to be linked to the mismatch in the distri-
bution of resources and expenditure responsibilities across levels of local govern-
ments. Also, given the robust and strong association between economic growth
and infrastructure spending, they may be indicative of a widening of disparities inMANASAN 85
economic development across levels of local government. They also underscore
the need to strengthen the regulatory framework and arrangements for LGU bor-
rowing and to address the requirement for LGU capital investment financing in the
design of intergovernmental transfers .
Third, personal services (PS) is the single biggest expenditure item at all
levels of local government. While the share of personal services in total LGU
expenditure contracted from 45.8 percent in 1991 to 34.2 percent in 2003 in the case
of cities, it expanded from 41.6 percent to 42.1 percent in the case of provinces and
from 46.1 percent to 50.8 percent in the case of municipalities. Because of these
developments, there has been a squeeze on the capital outlays of provinces and
on both the MOOE and capital outlays of municipalities.
In this regard, there is a need to reassess the compensation and position
classification system as  well as the list of mandatory LGU positions provided for
in the Local Government Code in order to give LGUs more leeway in adjusting their
PS expenditures. A review of the cap on PS expenditures is also important. Existing
practices and procedures that allow LGUs to comply with this requirement do not
appear to be helpful in enabling LGUs to effectively control their PS spending.
Tax assignment
The current tax assignment does not fare well in terms of the autonomy
criterion. While the Code authorizes LGUs to levy a good number of taxes, the
more revenue productive taxes are retained by the central government even as the
Code seriously constrains the power of LGUs to set local tax rates. Thus, the link
between LGU spending responsibilities and their taxing powers is weak.
Given this background, future Code amendments should focus on promot-
ing greater tax decentralization. In particular, such amendments should give LGUs
greater discretion in setting tax rates by (1) raising the maximum allowable tax
rates, (2) allowing them to adjust the tax rates more frequently, and (3) relaxing the
restrictions on the size of the tax rate adjustments that they are authorized to make.
More importantly, LGUs should be allowed to impose a surcharge (i.e., piggyback)
on some of the central government taxes (possibly, the individual income tax).
Also, the tax structure prescribed by the Code for the local business tax
should be simplified to ease up tax administration and improve taxpayer compli-
ance. At the same time, support for greater computerization and capacity building
for the staff of the tax division is critical.
Finally, the conduct of the general revision of the schedule of market values
of real property may be depoliticized by assigning this activity to the central
government. Such a move will not reduce the autonomy of LGUs, provided they
retain, if not increase, their control over local tax rates and assessment levels.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 86
Intergovernmental transfers
As in other countries, LGUs in the aggregate in the Philippines suffer a
vertical fiscal gap. Many types of taxes are either easier to administer at the central
level or are deemed unsuitable for local subnational government imposition be-
cause their tax bases are geographically mobile. The principle of subsidiarity im-
plies that many functions are best assigned to local governments. To a large
extent, this gap is addressed by intergovernmental transfers (specifically the IRA)
and LGUs have been clamoring to increase the size of the IRA pool.
Also, as indicated above, there is a mismatch between the assignment of
revenues (local taxes plus IRA) and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities
to the different levels of local government. The share of provinces and municipali-
ties in total LGU own-source revenue declined in the post-Code period despite
their large share in the cost of devolved functions.
In this context, there is a need to re-assess the tax and expenditure assign-
ment across different levels of local government. At the same time, the vertical
imbalance should be primarily addressed through greater tax decentralization—
the assignment of more tax bases to LGUs. Consequently, intergovernmental trans-
fers would then be re-designed to help close the disparities in the fiscal capacities
of LGUs and ensure that LGUs get the appropriate financing for them to meet the
minimum service standards for key basic social services.MANASAN 87
Annex Table 1.  Ratio to GNP of local government expenditures (in percent)
    A.  ALL LGUs 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
                 GRAND TOTAL 1.89 3.53 3.67 3.75 3.42 3.43
Total Economic Services 0.68 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.76 0.77
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09
Natural Resources 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Transportation and Communication 0.53 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.37 0.38
Other Economic Services 0.10 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.26
Total Social Services 0.29 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.78 0.84
Education 0.07 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.18 0.22
Health 0.08 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.38
Social Services, Labor and Employment 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08
Housing and Community Development 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.16
General Public Service 0.84 1.36 1.46 1.52 1.53 1.41
Public Administration 0.83 1.34 1.45 1.51 1.52 1.40
Peace and Order 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Others 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.32
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
    B.  ALL PROVINCES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
                 GRAND TOTAL 0.55 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.80 0.81
Total Economic Services 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.21
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Natural Resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 88
Annex Table 1 continued
    B.  ALL PROVINCES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transportation and Communication 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11
Other Economic Services 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07
Total Social Services 0.10 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.23
Education 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04
Health 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.16
Social Services, Labor and Employment 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Housing and Community Development 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
General Public Service 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.28
Public Administration 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.28
Peace and Order 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Others 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.06
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
    C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
                 GRAND TOTAL 0.76 1.33 1.32 1.30 1.25 1.18
Total Economic Services 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.24
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
Natural Resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Transportation and Communication 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08
Other Economic Services 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11
Total Social Services 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.22MANASAN 89
Annex Table 1 continued
    C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Education 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Health 0.01 0.12 0.134 0.123 0.120 0.104
Social Services, Labor and Employment 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Housing and Community Development 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04
General Public Service 0.43 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.61
Public Administration 0.43 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.60
Peace and Order 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Others 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
    D.  ALL CITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
             GRAND TOTAL 0.58 1.34 1.50 1.54 1.37 1.44
Total Economic Services 0.21 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.30 0.31
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Natural Resources 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transportation and Communication 0.15 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.18 0.18
Other Economic Services 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08
Total Social Services 0.12 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.33 0.38
Education 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.13
Health 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11
Social Services, Labor and Employment 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Housing and Community Development 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.11
General Public Service 0.22 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.53
Public Administration 0.22 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.51PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 90
Annex Table 1 continued
    D.  ALL CITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
    Peace and Order 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Others 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.16
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06









Annex Table 2.  Sectoral distribution of local government expenditures (in percent)
                                                                                      Average
    A.  ALL LGUs 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total Economic Services 32.85 24.59 35.76 27.62 25.19 24.58 22.17 22.36
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 1.27 3.01 1.08 3.03 3.08 2.90 2.89 2.71
Natural Resources 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.41 0.62 0.61 0.92 0.76
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 1.08 0.47 1.18 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.16 0.15
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.59 0.26 0.53 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.22
Transportation and Communication 24.59 13.16 27.85 16.07 13.89 12.83 10.74 11.08
Other Economic Services 5.32 7.10 5.12 7.27 6.75 7.44 7.23 7.44
Total Social Services 20.47 25.87 15.44 26.50 26.28 26.63 22.76 24.37
Education 7.48 7.15 3.58 7.16 7.45 7.58 5.39 6.30
Health 4.92 11.72 4.19 11.41 12.22 11.48 11.06 10.99
Social Services, Labor and Employment 2.74 2.28 2.83 2.14 2.22 2.47 2.17 2.30
Housing and Community Development 5.32 4.72 4.83 5.78 4.39 5.10 4.14 4.79
General Public Service 42.83 40.71 44.53 38.36 39.93 40.61 44.72 41.25







































2 Annex Table 2 continued
                                                                                      Average
    A.  ALL LGUs 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Peace and Order 2.54 0.41 0.55 0.54 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.41
Others 2.97 6.56 3.51 5.13 6.48 5.94 7.66 9.24
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.88 2.27 0.76 2.39 2.12 2.24 2.69 2.77
                                                                                      Average
    B.  ALLPROVINCES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total Economic Services 40.86 27.90 43.76 27.50 29.25 28.41 25.20 26.34
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 2.66 4.27 1.76 4.07 4.64 4.06 3.98 3.91
Natural Resources 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.52
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.57 0.42 0.66 0.73 0.57 0.09 0.01 0.06
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.63 0.13 0.67 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.04
Transportation and Communication 32.09 14.61 38.10 14.77 15.15 14.10 12.17 13.66









Annex Table 2 continued
                                                                                     Average
    B.  ALL PROVINCES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Total Social Services 21.13 31.96 17.93 36.29 32.57 30.87 27.43 28.73
Education 2.79 5.45 1.63 5.45 5.17 5.63 4.11 5.52
Health 3.78 21.56 2.91 21.58 23.05 20.23 20.42 19.57
Social Services, Labor and Employment 1.69 1.82 1.89 1.51 1.78 2.21 1.56 1.69
Housing and Community Development 12.88 3.14 11.50 7.75 2.57 2.80 1.34 1.95
General Public Service 33.71 32.17 34.35 29.67 31.28 32.61 35.09 34.73
Public Administration 33.63 32.08 34.33 29.34 31.24 32.58 35.02 34.67
Peace and Order 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.33 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06
Others 3.11 6.13 3.70 5.19 5.02 6.05 10.45 7.83
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 1.19 1.84 0.26 1.35 1.87 2.07 1.83 2.36
                                                                                     Average
    C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00







































4 Annex Table 2 continued
                                                                                     Average
    C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.27 4.05 0.22 4.27 4.23 4.05 3.97 3.63
Natural Resources 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.10
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.52 0.29 0.48 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.37 0.32
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.75 0.44 0.64 0.34 0.39 0.52 0.44 0.47
Transportation and Communication 19.29 8.40 21.59 10.85 8.14 8.19 7.43 7.14
Other Economic Services 6.40 8.18 7.03 8.44 8.14 8.18 7.97 9.01
Total Social Services 14.68 20.58 9.26 20.67 20.98 20.47 18.22 18.70
Education 8.04 4.52 3.71 5.55 4.15 4.01 3.12 3.84
Health 2.34 9.67 1.75 9.08 10.16 9.45 9.56 8.82
Social Services, Labor and Employment 2.61 2.92 2.27 2.67 2.91 3.14 2.97 2.99
Housing and Community Development 1.69 3.47 1.54 3.37 3.76 3.87 2.57 3.06
General Public Service 54.77 51.94 56.60 49.70 52.76 52.65 54.46 51.37
Public Administration 51.63 51.67 56.01 49.41 52.57 52.44 54.15 51.14
Peace and Order 3.13 0.27 0.58 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.23









Annex Table 2 continued
                                                                                     Average
    C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.38 1.09 0.29 0.72 1.25 1.19 0.99 1.22
                                                                                     Average
    D.  ALL CITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total Economic Services 32.34 25.46 35.81 31.13 26.36 25.07 22.12 21.52
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 1.21 1.32 1.58 1.12 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.28
Natural Resources 0.00 1.08 0.00 0.71 1.17 1.09 1.88 1.43
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 2.18 0.66 2.58 0.82 0.78 0.97 0.04 0.06
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.37 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.11
Transportation and Communication 24.17 16.60 26.39 22.10 18.22 15.97 12.95 12.88
Other Economic Services 4.41 5.61 5.03 6.16 4.72 5.59 5.85 5.76
Total Social Services 26.73 27.02 21.15 25.91 27.38 29.30 24.17 26.59







































6 Annex Table 2 continued
                                                                                     Average
    D.  ALL CITIES 1985-1991 1993-2003 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Health 9.01 7.68 8.59 7.12 7.91 8.03 6.93 7.95
Social Services, Labor and Employment 3.84 1.99 4.46 2.01 1.87 2.05 1.79 2.07
Housing and Community Development 2.85 6.81 2.87 6.89 5.98 7.49 7.23 7.81
General Public Service 36.86 35.65 38.35 32.76 33.57 35.21 41.45 36.60
Public Administration 32.82 34.91 37.34 31.81 32.97 34.48 40.73 35.85
Peace and Order 4.03 0.74 1.01 0.95 0.60 0.73 0.72 0.75
Others 2.87 8.28 2.85 5.47 9.67 7.19 7.51 11.00
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 1.20 3.59 1.84 4.73 3.02 3.23 4.75 4.29
*Adjusted for DOH & DA advancesMANASAN 97
Annex Table 3.  Per capita local government expenditures, in 1985 prices (including
transfers to NG)
A.  ALL LGUs 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 218.04 426.13 473.53 506.44 470.71 486.25
Total Economic Services 77.97 117.70 119.27 124.47 104.36 108.74
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 2.36 12.91 14.61 14.70 13.61 13.18
Natural Resources 0.00 1.75 2.93 3.08 4.33 3.67
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 2.57 2.47 2.62 2.60 0.73 0.72
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 1.15 1.10 1.37 1.43 1.10 1.07
Transportation and Communication 60.73 68.47 65.76 64.97 50.57 53.89
Other Economic Services 11.16 31.00 31.98 37.69 34.02 36.20
Total Social Services 33.66 112.91 124.47 134.85 107.12 118.51
Education 7.80 30.53 35.27 38.38 25.37 30.62
Health 9.14 48.64 57.88 58.16 52.05 53.44
Social Services, Labor and Employment 6.18 9.11 10.51 12.49 10.20 11.18
Housing and Community Development 10.53 24.64 20.81 25.83 19.51 23.28
General Public Service 97.09 163.46 189.07 205.66 210.49 200.60
Public Administration 95.88 161.14 187.54 203.74 208.52 198.61
Peace and Order 1.21 2.32 1.53 1.92 1.97 1.99
Others 7.65 21.87 30.69 30.11 36.08 44.91
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 1.66 10.18 10.03 11.35 12.65 13.49
B.  ALL PROVINCES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 79.99 134.93 142.99 156.72 140.54 149.52
Total Economic Services 35.00 37.10 41.83 44.52 35.42 39.38
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 1.40 5.49 6.63 6.37 5.59 5.84
Natural Resources 0.00 0.71 0.75 0.86 0.77 0.77PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 98
Annex Table 3 continued
B.  ALL PROVINCES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
    Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Power and Energy 0.53 0.99 0.82 0.14 0.02 0.08
    Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.54 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.07
    Transportation and Communication 30.48 19.93 21.66 22.10 17.10 20.43
    Other Economic Services 2.05 9.73 11.73 14.93 11.82 12.19
Total Social Services 14.34 48.97 46.57 48.37 38.55 42.96
Education 1.31 7.35 7.39 8.82 5.77 8.25
Health 2.33 29.12 32.96 31.70 28.70 29.26
Social Services, Labor and Employment 1.51 2.04 2.54 3.46 2.19 2.53
Housing and Community Development 9.20 10.46 3.68 4.39 1.88 2.92
General Public Service 27.48 40.03 44.72 51.11 49.32 51.93
Public Administration 27.46 39.59 44.67 51.06 49.22 51.84
Peace and Order 0.02 0.44 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.08
Others 2.96 7.01 7.18 9.48 14.68 11.71
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.21 1.82 2.68 3.24 2.57 3.53
31.54 21.17 22.72 22.36 17.24 20.58
C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 111.05 209.42 241.44 248.92 258.51 257.69
Total Economic Services 33.27 50.60 51.24 53.01 52.44 53.25
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.24 8.94 10.21 10.08 10.26 9.36
Natural Resources 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.25
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 0.53 0.50 0.68 0.68 0.95 0.82
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.72 0.72 0.94 1.30 1.14 1.21
Transportation and Communication 23.97 22.71 19.64 20.39 19.20 18.40
Other Economic Services 7.81 17.67 19.64 20.37 20.61 23.21MANASAN 99
Annex Table 3 continued
C.  ALL MUNICIPALITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Total Social Services 10.29 43.29 50.66 50.96 47.11 48.18
Education 4.12 11.62 10.02 9.98 8.08 9.89
Health 1.94 19.02 24.54 23.52 24.71 22.72
Social Services, Labor and Employment 2.52 5.59 7.01 7.82 7.67 7.71
Housing and Community Development 1.71 7.06 9.09 9.64 6.65 7.88
General Public Service 62.85 104.07 127.39 131.05 140.78 132.37
Public Administration 62.20 103.48 126.92 130.53 139.99 131.77
Peace and Order 0.65 0.59 0.47 0.53 0.80 0.60
Others 4.31 9.96 9.13 10.92 15.63 20.74
Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service 0.32 1.50 3.02 2.96 2.55 3.14
D.  ALL CITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
GRAND TOTAL 319.17 684.15 654.89 702.35 563.32 624.75
Total Economic Services 114.30 213.00 172.66 176.09 124.61 134.45
Agrarian Reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 5.03 7.69 7.88 8.80 7.13 7.98
Natural Resources 0.00 4.88 7.67 7.66 10.60 8.94
Industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Power and Energy 8.25 5.61 5.11 6.79 0.25 0.39
Water Resources Dev’t. and Flood Control 0.75 1.48 1.77 1.40 0.73 0.71
Transportation and Communication 84.24 151.19 119.29 112.19 72.93 80.45
Other Economic Services 16.04 42.15 30.94 39.25 32.97 35.97
Total Social Services 67.49 177.28 179.29 205.76 136.14 166.11
Education 16.69 67.65 76.13 82.37 46.29 54.73
Health 27.41 48.70 51.77 56.40 39.03 49.64
Social Services, Labor and Employment 14.24 13.78 12.25 14.38 10.08 12.95
Housing and Community Development 9.16 47.15 39.14 52.61 40.73 48.79
General Public Service 122.42 224.11 219.87 247.32 233.49 228.69PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 100
Annex Table 3 continued
D.  ALL CITIES 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003
Public Administration 119.18 217.63 215.94 242.20 229.42 223.97
Peace and Order 3.24 6.48 3.93 5.12 4.07 4.71
  Others 9.09 37.39 63.33 50.50 42.31 68.74
  Defense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Debt Service 5.87 32.37 19.75 22.68 26.78 26.77
*Adjusted for DOH & DA advancesMANASAN 101
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